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accomplishments, will well bear comparison with any past days;
and in saying this, we not in the least desire to derogate froma the
strength of Marshall, or the exhaustless learning of Story. These
were great men; perhaps their equals, in all particulars, do not
exist upon that bench; but the united bench we still think equal to
any past period of its history.
S.
Boston, Massachusetts.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the DistrictCourt of the United States,for the Westeir District
of Virginia, holden at. Wytheville, 185 8-In -Equity.
JOHN VINT Vs. 'THE HEIRS OF SAMUEL KING AND OF JOHN ALLEN AND
HANNAH HIS WIFE ET AL. (Original

and Supplemental Bill.

AlEXANDER FINDLEY vS. JOHN VINT ET AL. (Cross-bill.)
HANNAH AILEN'S HEIRS Vs. JOHN VINT ET AL.

(Cross-bill.)

DANIEL SHEFFEY'S ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIRS vs. JOHN VINT ET AL.

(Cross-bill.)
1. Construction of Will-Legal and equitable estate-Condition subsequent-Result.
ing trust-Alienage and naturalization- Mere possibility distingished from
equitable estate-Abeyance-Bills of partition substituted for writ of partitionDifference in measure of relief, when jurisdiction of equity concurrent with, and
exclusive of, that of thb courts of law. Fraud never presumed-Inadequacy of
consideration not a ground to set aside a contract of hazard-Recitals in a deedwhether time is of the essence of a contract-A receipt prima fade evidenceAnswer, when evidence-Issue out of chancery-Laches-Creditor at large-Assignor and assigee-A will contained the following clause: "In case of having
no children, I then leave and bequeath all my real estate, at the death of my wife,
to W. K. son of brother J. K., on condition of his marrying a daughter of W. T.
and my niece R. T. in trust for the eldest son or issue of such marriage.: W. T.
and his wife both died without having had a daughter born to them, whereby the
performance of the condition: on which W. K. took the estate, became impossible.
Held by the Supreme Court of the United States: 1. That this clause vested in W. K.
the legal estate in fee simple, on a condition subsequent. Findiay et al. vs. King's
Lessee, 3 Peters Rep. 846. 2. But W. K. took no beneficial estate in fee, but
an estate in trust for his issues, springing from his intermarriage with the unborn
daughter of a husband and wife, both of whom died without the birth of a daughter, and that the trust having failed, there remained a resultingtrust to the heirs
at law of the testator, who were entitled to partition. King vs. Mitchell et al.
8 Peters Rep. 326.
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2. The next of kin of the testator, were three brothers and sisters of the whole
blood, and a brother and sister of the half blood. These last, by the law of descents of Virginia, were entitled to half portions. This half brother and half sister were born in Ireland, and were never naturalized by any act of their own.
But their father, also an Irishman by birth, was naturalized under the law of
Virginia, in 1787. The two children last referred to, were then minors living in
Ireland, came to Virginia in 1792, and resided there until after 1802, when an
act of Congress was passed, declaring that the children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the United States, or who, previous to the passage
of anLy law on that subject by the Government of the United States, may have become citizens of any one of the said States under the laws thereof, being under
the age of twenty-one years, at the time of their parents leing so naturalized,
shall, if dwelling in the United States, be considered as citizens of the United States
These children were naturalized by virtue of this Act of Congress, and so, capable of acquiring title to real estate by descent.
3. The resulting trust remaining in the heirs at law of the testator, was not a
inere.possib ity, incapable of being granted, assigned or devised, but an equitable estate perfectly capable of such transfer. This resulting trust, the creature of
equity, had its existence at the moment of the testator's death. It descended to his
heirs at law, subject to be divested whenever the express trust created by the will
became vested, and did not remain in abeyance, until the condition onwhich the express trust was to vest, became impossible. Therefore, from the moment of the
testator's death, his heirs at law, had a defeasible and conditional estate cast
upon them by the law, which they might as effectually alien, as if it had been
indefeasible and unconditional, and l6gal as well as equitable.
4. In limitations of legal estates where a remainder of inheritance is limited in contingency, by way of use or by devise, the inheritance in the meantime, if not
otherwise disposed of, remains in the grantor and his heirs, or in the heirs of
the testator, until the contingency happens to take it out of them: and equity
herein follows the law.
5. Ordinarly, an application to a Court of equity for partition, is not an appeal to
the sound discretion of the Court, to be granted or refused according to the circumstances of the case, as in bases of specific execution and other cases, but the
right to demand partition is ex debito Juilitim,if the complainant can show a clegr"
legal title.
6. The bill for partition is a substitute for the now obsolete remedy by writ'of partition in the law courts, and Courts of equity, in their proceedings on these bills
as in other cases of concurrentjurisdiction, give the same relief that was formerly
afforded in the courts of law by writ of partition. Questions of fraud were not
cognizable in these latter tribunals where a party brought his writ of partition
and the same rule obtains in equity courts whenever the plaintiff had his election
to proceed either at law, or in equity. But where complainant in equity stands
upon a purely e~uitable title, of which courts of law will riot take cognizance at
all, the jurisdiction of equity is exclusive, and courts of equity are left free to adopt
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our cherished principles, and to apply their power to detect and eviscerate latent
frauds and concealments which the process of a court of law is not adapted to
reach, and to relieve against them.
7. It seems, that even where a plaintiff in equity seeking partition, shows a clear legal title, if the defendant files a cross-bill alleging fraud in the procurement of
his conveyance by the plaintiff in the original bill, who, instead of demurring to
the cross-bill, answers and denies the fraud, and depositions are taken on each
side to establish and repel the imputation of fraud respectively, it is too late at
the trial, for the original pliintiff, to object that equity has no jurisdiction to examine questions of fiaud on bills for partition. The cross-bill, filed by the defendant against a plaintiff is, to some extent, a substitute for an independent and
original bill: and as, after a decree for partition in favor of a plaintiff showing a
clear legal title, the defendant would doubtless be entitled to relief in equity by
a new bill impeaching the plaintiff's title, on the ground of fraud, no reason is
perceived why the same measure of relief should not be applied in favor of the
plaintiff in the cross-bill, the defendant having waived his right to object to the
jurisdiction of e'quity to take cognizance of questions of fraud in such cases. Fraud
is never presumed by the law: it must always be proved, and the onus is upon the
party alleging it.
8. The power of courts of equity to set aside and annul executed contracts on the
ground of inadequacy of consideration, is a most delicate one, and should be applied with extreme caution. Mere inadequacy of consideratioii is not to be understood in'eqaity as constitutingper se, a ground to avoid a contract, unless it
be so gross as to shock the conscience. In such cases, it is evidence per se, sufficient t6 avoid it. But where the contract is one of hazard, and the question
whether it will be profitable or ruinous is dependent on future contingencies, the
issue of which no human foresight can discover, the Court has no satisfactory
standard by which to determine whether the price was inadequate or no, much
less, whether the inadequacy was so gross as to constituteper se evidence of fraud:
and it should refuse to interfere with the legal operation of the contract.
9. Qusre, whether the recitals of a deed executed by a grantor to a grantee, tending
to show the execution of a former deed by the same grantor to another grantee,
estop the grantor and those claiming under him from denying the fact of the execution of such deed? This question cannot be determined unless the party
'claiming a benefit under such deed, puts the fact of its execution distinctly in issue by bringing his bill to set it up as a lost deed, averring its execution and loss.
10. X bill for specific execution of a contract is not entertained in equity as a matter of right, but is addressed to the sound discretion of the Court. Case in which
in the exercise of this judicial discretion, the prayer for specific execution was
denied.
11. In ordinary cases the non payment of money by a stipulated day is not sufficient of itself to defeat the blaim of a party to specific execution, since interest
will usually compensate the party for the delay, and equity relieves from forfeitures whenever it can make compensation. But when parties enter into an exe-
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cutory contract of sale whereby it is stipulated, that if the vendor did not pay
the purchase money within a prescribed period, the contract should be null and
vold, they have chosen to make time of the essence of their contract in express
terms, and even partial payments made within the period will not entitle the vendor to demand a decree for specific execution. To decree specific execution, under such circumstances, would in truth be, not the enforcement of the contract
between the parties, but the assumption of authority by a Court of Equity to make
a contract for the parties which they had not made for themselves. The Court
should treat the contract as rescinded and require the vendor to refund so much
of the purchase money as has been paid by the vendee. Especially should specific execution be refused when the bill was brought after a great lapse of time
which wrought great changes in the relations of the parties and in the subject of
the contract.
12. A receipt is'pma fade evidence that the sum of money expressed in it, was
paid according to its tenor.
13. A bill is brought for specific execution of a contract of sale of real estate between the ancestor of the plaintiffs and the defendant: a written contract of sale,
between the parties and a receipt executed by the vendor to the vendee, acknowledging the payment of a large portion of the purchase money are produced
by the plaintiffs and filed as exhibits with their bill: no discovery is sought by
the bill of the genuineness of the contract and receipt, or of the fact whether the
money was paid or not. the answer admits the execution of both by the defendant, but denies that the money was in fact paid, as stated in the receipt, and
other evidence exists in the cause tending to show that the money was not
paid: Held, 1. That the answer not being responsive to the bill, was not evidence that could avail the respondent. 2. That as there was other evidence in"
the cause tending to repel the presumption of payment arising from the execution of the receipt, it was proper to direct an issue to be tried by a jury, to determine whether the money had been in truth paid or no?
14. A mere creditor at large will not be entertained in equity, to enable him to
reach the equitable estate of his debtor. He must obtain a judgment at law,
binding the real estate of his debtor, before he can come into equity. The judgment lien is the necessary foundation for the equitable jurisdiction, and equity
lends its aid to make that lien effectual whenever it cannot be enforced. by execu-.
tion at law.
15. The relation of assignor and assignee of a chose action examined and discussed.

These causes were very elaborately argued by James W. ,Seffey, Esq., and Hon. A. . B. Stuart, as counsel for the complainant in the original bill and the representatives of Daniel Sheffey, by
Beverly R. Tohnston, B. Rush. Foyd and Col. Leftwick, as counsel for Alexander Findlay and the heirs of Hannah Allen, and by
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f"lzomas J. Mickie, .sq.;

on behalf of the representatives of

Daniel Sheffey.
The following opinion was delivered by
BROOKENBROUGH, Jk--William King died in October, 1808,
seised and possessed of-an immense real and personal estate. His
will'contains the following clause: " In case of having no children, I then leave -and bequeath all my real estate, at tihe death
of my wife, to William King, son of brother James King, on condition of his marrying a daughter of William Trigg and my niece
Rachel, his wife, late Rachel Findlay, in trust for the eldest son or
issue of such marriage: and in case such marriage, should not take
place, I leave and bequeath said estate to any child, giving preference to age, of*said William and Rachel Trigg, that will marry a
child of my brother James King's, or of sister Elizabeth, wife of
John Mitchell, and to their. isue." William Trigg and his wife
both died about the year 1819, without having a daughter born to
them during their coverture, whereby the performance of th9 condition on which the estate was devised to the testator's nephew became impossible. William Trigg ahd his wife left four sons, but
neither of these has intermarried with a daughter of James King,
or of Elizabeth Mitchell, and it is said that such intermarriage has
become, by the deathof some of the'parties, and the marriage of others,
and the advanced age of all t6e survivors in this class, an extremely
improbable but not an absolutely impossible event. The question,
therefore, whether this second limitation over is valid, or too remote and therefore void, does not arise on this record, since none
of the contingencies on which it was to rest, have as yet occurred.
The construction of the clause ofthe will of Wiliam King quoted above,
(except the last member of it,)'has been determined by-the Supreme
Court of the United States, in two cases presenting this question.
In the first of these cases' it wba held: 1. That the estate was devised to William King, son of James, on a condition subsequent.
We are indebted to Mr. J'utice Brockenbrough for this elaborate opinion.

Its

marked and important character must be our apology for admitting it,
notwithstanding its unusual length.
Finlday et al. vs. King's Lessee, 3 Peters Rep. 346.
-
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2. That the legal title of all the testator's real estate, not specifically devised to his wife for life, vested in the devisee William King,
at the death of the testator, and that the devisee took a vested remainder in the residue. 3. That the question whether William
King took an estate which, in the events which had happened, (the
death of William Trigg and wife without the birth of a daughter,
whereby the performance of the condition, subsequent had become
impossible,) enured to his own benefit, or was to be considered as a
trustee for the heirs at law of the testator, could not be decided
in an action of ejectment, and could only be determined by a court
of equity, on a bill to be brought by the heirs to enforce the execution of the trust.
In accordance with the suggestions of the Supreme Court, a bill
was exhibited on the Equity side of this Court by some of the heirsat-law of William King, the testator, praying that the judgment
rendered in the action of ejectment in favor of the devisee, William
King, be enjoined, and that partition be made of the real estate of
said testator among his heirs-at-law, the trusts on which the legal
estate was devised to William King, the younger, having failed. A
decree directing partition to be made in accordance with the prayer
of the bill was rendered by this Court, and from this decree William
King, the younger, appealed to the Supreme Court. After a forensic
and judicial argument of eminent ability, the Supreme Court decided
that William King, the devisee, had "no beneficial estate in fee, but
an estate in trust for his issue; and that the trust having failed,
there remains a resulting trust to the heirs-at-law of the testator, if
the devise over does not take effect."' The decree of this Court was
affirmed.
The testator, William King, died without issue. He survived.his
father, and his heirs-at-law were three brothers and sisters and their
descendants of the whole blood, and a half brother and half sister,
who by the laws of Virginia inherit half portions.
The original bill, in the causes now before the Court, was filed at
the December Rules, 1838. The object of the bill was to have the
. I King vs. Mitchell et al., 8 Peters' Rep. 826.
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one-fourth part of the estate of William King, the testator, which
had descended to his half-brother, Samuel King, and his half-sister,
Hannah Allen, set apart'and conveyed to the complainant, John
Vint, in virtue of an"alleged purchase of those interests from John
Allen and the said Hannah, his wife, by deed bearing date November 16th, 1810, and from the said Samuel King and wife, by deed
dated January 1st, 1811. These deeds are filed as exhibits with
the bill. Their validity has been impeached on various grounds,
both by the answers and cross-bills, by the heirs of Hannah Allen
and of Samuel King, and by Alexander Findlay, pendente lite purchaser from the heirs of Samuel King, of their interest in the estate
of their half-uncle, William King. Several of these grounds apply
in common to both deeds," and will therefore be considered in connection with both. The allegation of fraud and covin made against
each, will demand a separate consideration, as the state of facts and
circumstances attending the two transactions from whici the conclusion of fraud, if it exist, is evolved, is essentially different in the
two cases.
The consideration of the claim of the personal representative,
widow ind heirs of Daniel Sheffey, resting as it does 'on grounds
peculiar to itself, will be postponed until the merits of the
controversy between the other parties have been discussed and
determined.
The objections to the validity of the deeds will be severally
considered.
It is insisted in the answers and cross-bills of the defendants, that
the deeds were inoperative and void because the grantors, Samuel
King and Hannah Allen, were unnaturalized aliens, and therefore
could inherit no part of the real estate which descended from their
deceased half-brother, William King, to his heirs-at-law. The
defendants, children of Samuel King and Hannah Allen, insist
that, being born in Virginia, they are invested with the full rights
of citizenship, "and that the law of Virginia cast the descent of the
proportion of the estate of which William King died seised, which
their parents, if citizens, would have inherited, immediately upon
them. By the stern principles of the common law, not only could
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an alien -not inherit lands in England, but it was generally true
that no inheritance could be transmitted from or through an aien
ancestor, either lineal or collateral; nor was it of any consequence
whether the alien ancestor through whom the party claimed were
living or dead at the time of the descent cast. In either case, the
alienage of the medius ancestor was an absolute bar to the descent,
for an alien had no inheritable blood. This harsh feature of the
common law was abrogated in England by the Statute 11 & 12
Will. III., ch. 6, subsequently modified by the Statute 25 Geo. IL,
ch. 39, and the more benign policy of these British Statutes was at
an early period of our history adopted in the legislation of Virginia. By the Act of 1785, it was enacted, that "in making-title
by descent, it shall be no bar to a party that any ancestor through
whom he derives his descent from the intestate is or h1atk been an
alien." This provision has been uniformly re-enacted by all the
subsequent revisals, and has constantly been perpetuated as a rule
of descent in Virginia from the time of its original adoption to this
hour. At the late revisal of 1849 it was re-enacted in the very
language of the original act, except that the words "whether living
or dead" are interpolated in brackets. This interpolation was
wholly unnecessary, for it had already been decided by the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeals that, by virtue of this provision a title by descent was transmissible through an alien ancestor, lineal or collateral, even though such ancestor were living at
the time of the descent cast. Indeed, assuming the hypothesis
that Samuel King and Hannah Allen were unnaturalized aliens to
be true, the present case would be precisely parallel with the case.
of Jackson vs. Saunders, and it would result, as a necessary conclusion from the premises, that the children of Samuel King and of
Hannah Allen, who were in being at the death of William King,
(having been all born in Virginia,) acquired title by descent to oneeighth part, respectively, of the real estate whereof he died intestate.
But the hypothesis itself is not true. In the progress of this cause
it has been ascertained, from an examination of the records of Bote" I Jackson vs. Saunders et al., 2 Leigh. 109.
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tourt County, in this State, that Thomas King, the father of Samuel
King and of Hannah Allen, was duly naturalized on the 9th.of May,
1787, and an ofoial copy of the certificate of naturalization is filed
as an exhibit in tl'e cause. It is in proof, that..thp said Samuel and
Hannah were -bothminors at the date of their -father's naturalization,
The only question remaining to be considered in this connection is:
Did the naturalization of- the father confer upon his infant childreu
the rights of citizefiship without any act of their own? The solution of this question must be found in the Act of Congress of 1802,
and the interpretation placed upon it by the Courts. By the 4th
section of the Act of April 14th, 1802, it is enacted that "the
children of persons duly naturalized under any of the laws of the
United States, or who, previous to the passage of any law on 'that
subject by the Government of the United States, may have become
citizens of any one of the said States, under the laws thereof, being
under the age of twenty-one years at the time of their parents being
so naturalized, or admitted to the rights of citizenship, shall, if
dwelling in the United States8, be considered as citizens of the
United' States.
Thomas sing,:an Irishman by birb, came to Virginiarin 1782,
was naturalized in .1787, and continued to zeside in Virginia till his
death, which occurred but a short time before that of his son, William King. His children, Samuel and Hannah, were born in Ireland, came to Virginia in 1792, and continued to reside in this State
till after the death of their half-brother, William. If the requirement of the Act, that the minor children. who shall be entitled to
its benefits sh~ll be residents of the United States, has reference to
the date of the naturalization of the father, then Samuel and Hannah were not naturalized by t1~e naturalization of their father, since
they were then in Ireland, and did not come to Virginia till five
years after that event: but if it is to be interpreted -as having
reference to the date of the passage of the Act, they became in
virtue thereof duly naturalized citizens of the United States. This
is not an open question.* It was before the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Campbell vs. Gordon and Wife, ' and
12 Conn. Rep. Supreme Court of U. S. 84.
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the Court adopted the latter construction. They held that the Act
conferred the rights of citizenship upon a party who, at the date of
her father's naturilization, was an infant residing in*Scotland ithere
she was born, but who came to the United States before 1802, and
resided here at the passage of the Act. It is aitogether clear, therefore, that Samuel Ring and Hannah Allen were naturalized "bhy t'
naturalization of their father, and that, eofi'se4ftntly, they and not
their children weie heirs- t-li of their half-brother, William t'Mng.
It is insistedagain, that thesb aeeds were vdid ab fttio,' beda;i6
it is said that the grantors had no eattdte i i'the subject'of.the grant,
but only a possib'ltty, which a't
commbni law could not be gtanted,
assigned.or even devised unless it were a possibility of a Utfst. The
proposition is undoubtedly correct 'that the etnmbn law ieued ah
transfers and conveyaiices of'mere p6s fbfllties, ab W-- ais'
od'al
choses in action, as absolute iiullities, and the wisdoffi of &he common law herein is warmly commended by .ord Coke. "'Ttwhat
does the term "potss bility," a§ used by common law writrs,.tpbrt.
It was never applied to interests which *weretested, eithdr in ititefrt
or possession,
ays to rem
e.
A few examples drawn from the old books will l|lustrdte t -h6
meaning of this tem better thatt any defilition, however accurate.
where a term is devised to A fdr life, remainder to B, aiAl hvis.a
this future interest to C, and dies; alid then A dies •thi devib 'to
o is void; and the executors of B shall have i.t S6 dk ah lsksignment. A man possessed of a term'- for divbrs yeirs,'desed the
profits thereof to one for life, ind after his ddcgase to ildtht 'fot"
the residue of the yeafs, and died: the Aest devsee entetdd by the
assent of the executor and afterwarbS he ii remainder,' during the
life of the irst devisee, assigned it to aiother, aMd a' tdrwards the
first devisee died: it was- adjudged that the agsigiimepnt was vbiA,
for he in remainder had but a possibility duriuig the lifM of tlE6 Arst
devisee: for it is as much in law as if the land had beeii de'ised to
him for so many years as he should live, or for the whole term, if he

2

Jacob's Law Diet., title "Possibility," 4 Coke'a Rdp. 66.
8 Lev. 427, cited in Jacob's Law Dict.'ubi supra.
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should live so long, so that the interest of the term, 8ub modo, is in
him, and -the other in remainder has but a possibility, which he
cannot grant over. 1 Now, here the common:-law reasoned. with its'
accustomed.technicality. A-term of however lpng duration is but
a chattel. intepest, a chattel real, and-the law presumed that the life
of the first taker would or might endure.beyond the term, and therefore the limitation over, which would. have been void -by way of
remainder,-was supported when:-made by .will as a good executory
devise: but though a good executory devise, the probability of its
ever vesting was: considered .to be so remote as to constitute theexpectant, interest devised a mere possibility, -whereas a like interest
in a freehold estate would have been held to. be a vested remainder,
which the remainder-man might well assign. But though thedevise
of the residue, of a term after a life estate.was thus anciently held
to be a mere possibility whic , the devise,: dur4ng the- continuance of the life ep.te, could neither.devise nor assign, yet.Mr. Feame
cites, many modern adjudications, of the. Court-of Chancery to prove
that, in. his day even, possibilifiesof personal Qstates were devisable
as well as assignable in equity.. And in reference to freehold interests, we are told by the'same high authority that modern decisions
have :extended the same power of-testamentary disposition to, contingent and executory descendible interests'by considering the word
"having," in the Statute of Wills.as equivalent to having an interest
in. In such cases, a distinction has been established between a bare
po88sbizliy and a possibility accompanied with an intere8 . and the

broad proposition is maintained, that wherever the integest, though
contingent, is descendible, it is also devisable.

.

Now, we are to determine, whether the resulting trust remaining
in the heirs at law of Win. King, .was a bare possibility,, incapable
of transfer by deed, or. a vesaed equitable interest, perfectly susceptible of. such transfer. Its equitable 'nature is determined by the
decision of the Supreme Court. The whole legal estate in fee was
vested in William King, son of James, but he had no beneficial inI Co. Rep. part iv., p. 66.
22 Fearne on Rem. 489-40.
3 1 Fearne, 546.
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terest whatever. The equitable estate was devised-in contingency
to the issue of a marriage between the devisee of the legal estate
and an unborn daughter of parents, both of whom are'dead without having a daughter born to them. The condition, therefore, on
which the equitable estate was to vest, has become impossible. But
this condition was not impossible when the deeds were executed to
the complainant by two of the heirs at law-of the testator. William
Trigg and wife were then both living, and survived the execution of
the deeds several years. - The argument of the counsel for the defendants is, that no trusi resulted to the heirs at law of the testator,
until the condition on which the express trust was'to vest, became
impossible by the death of the Triggs without a daughter; and
that the express trust having only failed at that moment,. the implied trust at the same instant resulted to the'next of kin of the
testator, who were theni in esse, to whom the equitable title then,
and not till then, descended on the heirs at law of the testator.
The question is an -important one, because at this -:latter i period,
Samuel King, one of the grantors in the' deeds, was dead, leaving
children who are parties to this suit. If the position of'their counsel be sound, they and not their father are heirs at law of William
King. In support of this position that the next of kin of 'the teatator who were in being at the-death of Mr. and Mrs.: Triggrwithout a daughter, are his true heirs at-law to whom the trust resulted,
I am referred by the counsel to two cases found in the English
Chancery Reports. Upon examination, I find thait they were cases,
not of resulting, but of express trusts. In each case the Will carried
the -whole estate, not absolutely indeed, but -yet the whole estate.
In the first of them,' the testator devised certain personal estate to his wife, "but did desire her, at or before her death, to give such
estate, (jewels, furniture, &c.,) unto, and among such 'of. his own
relations as she.should think most deserving, and approve of." The
will was held to create a trust by the force' of th -words 'above
quoted, in favor of such of the testator's relations 'living at the
death of the wife, as she should deem most deserving. It Ws held
to be a trust in favor of his -relations who should survive his wife,
IHarding vs.

Glyn, 1 Atk. 469.
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with a power of selection by her. This power was not executed by
the wife, who died without designating the favored object of her
husband's bounty, and as in equity a trust never fails for want of a
trustee, the execution of the power devolved upon the Court. The
Master of the Rolls sid that though thio was not to pass by the
statute of distribution;. (for it lys not a case of. intestacy at all,)
yet that the statute furnished a good rlle to go by, and he directed
*an-equal distribution amovg the relations of the testator, who were
his next.of kin at the time of her death. The other case' is extremely similar to the first. "The testatrix bequeathed her whole
estate for life to her sister, and expressed her desire that her legatee, at her own death, bequeathed to those of her own family the
property given by the will, provided they behaved well to her, with
decency and affection." The Master of the Rolis Sir William
Grantos.id: "To constitute a valid trust, undoubtedly three circumstances must. concur: sufficient word. to raise i4 a definite
subject, and. a . .ertain and ascertained object. There is no doubt
that in this instnce the words are sufficiently certain to raise a
trust. There is no doubt that there is a definite subject. The doubt
is wheth' r the object is- sufficiently definite, or capable of being
ascertained." The conclusion he reached was, that the word "fanfly" used in .this will, was as definite a designation -of the objects of
the testator's bounty, as the word "relations" used in Hardingvs,
yn. In this case, as in that, the legatee for life had declined to
execute the power of selection conferred by, the will, and its execu-

tion devolved on the Court; and the property was given to the next
of kin of the legatee, in whose favor the will created the trust. It
is extremely clear, then, from the review of these two cases, that
they wholly fail to establish the position for -which they were cited,
and, in tho absence of any express authority to -guide me, I must
solve the question by the light of reason, aided -by the well establisbed analogies of the law.
The question is rendered complicated by the complete separation
which the will has made.between the legal and the .equitable estate.
The legal -estate vested in William.King the younger in fee, the
SCruwys vs. Colman, 9 Ves. 819.
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equitable estate, so far as it is disposed of at all by the will, is devised to persons not in ease. Let us "simplifythe question by inquiring what would have been the effect if no divorce had been effected
between the legal and equitable estates. Suppose the whole estate
had been devised to William King for life, remainder to such of
the children of a marriage to be consummated between him and an
unborn- daughter of William and Rachel Trigg, as should be living
at the death of the devisee for life, in fee simple. This would be a
devise to William King for life, with a good contingent remainder
in fee to persons not in ease, which could never vest till the death
of the devisee for life. What would become of the reversion, meanwhile ? There is no principle better settled by authority than that
where a remainder of inheritance is limited in contingency, by way
of use, or by devise, the inheritance in the meantime, if not otherwise disposed of, remains in the grantor and his heirs,'or in the
heirs of the testator, until the contingency happens to take it out of
them.' Thus, where one made a feoffment tQ the use of such person or persons, and for such estate and eattqp as he should limit and
appoint by his last will in writing,2 one -of the resolutions of the
Court was, that where a man makes a-feoffmept to the use of his
last will, he has the use in the meantime. So, where the inheritance.
is devised in contingency, it descends, if not. otherwise disposed of,
to the testator's heir, till the contingency is removed: as, where A.
devised lands to B, his heir, for life, and if R should die without
issue living at his death, that 'then the same should remain to C in
fee: but if B should have issue living at his, death, then the fee
should remain in the right heirs of B; it was resolved that B took
an estate for life, with remainder in fee in contingency; and it was*
said by Wyndham aid Twisden, and agreed by the other judges,
that the fee descended to B as heir, until the contingency happened,
though not so as to confound his estate for life, and was not in
abeyance; that in relation to C, B took only an estate for life: but
in the meantime, by operation of law, he had the fee in such sort,
as that there should be an hiatus to let in the contingency when it
'1 Fearne on Con. Rem. 513.
Sir Edward Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17 b.
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happened. So in the case of Purefoy vs. Rogers,' where S devised
lands to'his Wife for life, and if it should please God to bless her
with a son, a6d she 'should call that son by the testator's christian
and surname, he gave the inheritance of the lands to him, after his
mother's life, and if he died before he came to 21, then the testator
-gave the inheritance of his lands after his wife's life, to the testa"tor's heirs forever. -Before any son was born, 'the heir ot' the testator conveyed"the estate to the wife and her second husband by
fine.* Saunders urged'that the contingent"remainder to the son was
not destroyed, for that. at the time of the fine, the heir of the 'testator 'had'no reversion or estate in him: for -that an estate for life
was devised to thb: wife.'and the remainder in fee was de'vised to the
son iicontingency;, so that until it could be known whether such
contingency would happen or 'not,the reversion mu8t be in abeyance

and not in the'heir: and "then his 'conveyance gave no' estate to the
husband and wife, but ihey were ovly tenants for life of the wife as
before. But Hale,'. J., interrupted him and said it was clear that
the rever'sion 'was in' the heir of the testator by descent and not
in abelyance;"and accoidivgly it was adjudged that the cdntingent
remainder was 'destroyed 'by,the merger of the'particulkr estate for
life in the'reversion conveyed'by the testator's heir at law.2
I have made these 'large citations from this celebrated work, not
only because it is of the highest authority on all such questions, but
because this doctrine is one of rare application in Virginia. The
case§" dited are sufficient to show that this old notion of the fee
being in abey'ance where' therie is a contingent limitation in fee,
until Lhe contingency happns; 'a noti96n which was adop ted by a no
less celebrated writer than" Blackstone himself, is an'egregibus fallacy; anud lias been triumphantly exploded by Fearne. The argunietts 'of' this latter Writer, draown both from reason and authority,
is' close, logical and unanswerable, and affords one of the most beautiful:specimens of demoistratiou to be found in any legal'work. I
am sure, therefore, that I stand'upon impregnable ground in holding
that, in case of conveyaMes of legal estates, either by way of use
12 Saund. 380; 1 Fearne 517.
I1 Fearne 516 ; 2 Saund. 386-7.
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or devise, if the entire fee is not granted or devised, or- is granted
or devised by way of contingent remainder; in either case the reversion in fee remains in the grantor and his heirs, or descends to
the heirs of the testator; and that this reversion so desc6iding is
not a mere yo8sibility, which cannot be granted, but an estate vested
in the first case, contingent in the latter, which may be conveyed as
effectually as if it were veited in possession as well as in interest.
All the cases cited above illustrate and establish this proposition.
But the resulting-trust remaining in the testator's heirs at law,
in the case at bar; is not. a legal, but an equitable estate.' Does
equity adopt. a different rule from that adopted by the law courts,
or does it follow the law ?
It is ienerally true that equity applies the same rules• of construction -t trust 'estateb,'that 'a court of law applies 'to legal
estates. This general':proposition is- liable to many exceptions
where a departure from the rigid technical iles of law is necessary
to give-effect to 'the limitations -of the trust estate. - These exceptions need not be here discussed; since the case at bar does not fall
within the dperition of iny of them, but must bb govbrned'-by the
general rule. Fearne says, after noticing some of those -exceptions;
and particilarly cases in which Lord Hardwick'had denied the .
application, of the ue in Shelley's case, to limitatloiis of'trust
estates, thae " even a Court -of Equity, in order to pieserve as near
a corres 'ondence as may be, between the rules of construction,
with regard to trust estates and those lawh y':which legal estates
are construed, coinsiders itself as bounden, evefi in tlie :case of trust
estates, to decree acdording.4o' the rule I have been speaking of,
wherever it can be done without manifest violati6n of the intentlonof the parties. Of this)- the case. of Sweetaple. Vs. Bindon is a
strong instanbe. Thus where A. by'will gave X3.0 to her daughter
to be laid out in land and settled to'the use of her shid: daughter
and her children, and if she died- without issue, remainder over.
The daughter married, and after her decease a bill was bropght by
her husbaand to have the money laid out in land, and the land
settled on him -for life, as tenant by the curte~y, or to have the
interest of the-money for life, in lieu of the profits of the land.
The Court held that if it had been an immediate devise of the
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land, the daughter would have been, by the-words of the will, tenant
in tail, and consequently the husb~nd would have been tenant by
the curtesy ; and. that in ease of a voluntary divise, the Court
must take it as t)ey found it, and not lessen the estate or benefit of
the legatee; although, upon like words in marriage articles, it
might be otherwise, where it appeared the estate was intended to be
preserved for the benefit of the issue; and therefore decreed the
money to be considered as lands, and; the husband to have the
interest for his life, as tenant by the curtesyl. In discussing the
same rule, Judge Story says that trusts in real property which are
exclusively cognizable in equity, aie now, in many respeots, governed
by the same rules as the like estates at l~aw, an. afford a striking
illustration of the maxim Aiqutas sequitur legem.

Thus, for

example, they -are descendible,,deqiabe and alienable; a~nd heirs,
devisees and alienees, may, and generally do- take therein the same
interests in point of construction. and dpration, and -they are
affected by the. same incidents, properties -and - consequences, as
would, under like circumstances, apply to similar estates at law. 2
These authorities are apt and conclusive to show that in cses like
that at bar, the same rule-of construction must be applied in.
equity
to the equitable estate or resulting trust remaining in the heirs at
law, that a Court of law would apply to legal estates similarly
cir mstanced; qnd since we have already shown that if this
4*. been a legal estate, the reversion not disposed of by the will
would have descended to the heirs at law, and not have remained
in abeyance; that such reversion, so descended, would have constituited not a mere possibility, but 9 vested estate, susceptiblb of
trApnsfer by deed or devise; it results That the equitable estate here
wqs impressed with the same qualities, and that this objection to
the -validity of the deeds from Samuel King and from John Allen
andqwife, to John Vint, is not well taken.
T~e question of fraud arising in this case next presents itself for
consideration, but a preliminary objection raised by the counsel for
the complainant, must first be disposed of. Thi* is a bill for partitioA, and as there is no question as to the genuineness of the deeds
under which the complainant claims, it is said that he has a right
I Fearne,

184 and 164.

21 Story's Com. on Eq.,

974.
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to demand partition of this estate ex desito justitice, and that this

Court cannot take cognizance of the question of fraud in such a
suit. A decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia, is cited to
sustain this proposition. It was held in that case, that an application to a Court of Equity for partition, was not an appeal to the
sound discretion of the Court, to be granted or refused, according
to the circumstances of the case, as in cases of specific performance
and other cases, 'but to be due ex debito justitice. It is a remedy
substituted for the perplexed and difficult remedy by writ of partition, a remedy which is now wholly obsolete. The only indispensable requisite, says Judge Green, in his opinion in that case, to
entitle the plaintiff to relief in such cases, is, that he 8hall s8how a
clear legal title. If his title is disputed or doubtful, as if there be
a question whether the deeds under which he claims are forged, or
if his title depends upon difficult and doubtful questions of law
which are emphatically proper for a Court of law; the decree for
partition is suspended intil he establishes his title at law, not in a
writ of partition, but by ejectment or other-legal remedy. And if
in such proceeding he establishes the genuineness of his title papers,
or the questions of law on which his title depends, are decided in
his favor, he returns to the Court of Equity, and partition is decreed according to his established rights. In these views of Judge
Green, the whole Court concurred, and I am satisfied that the conclusion of the Court is abundantly sustained by authority. But
there ar several reasons why this case, in .rny view of it, has no
Application to the case at bar. The narrow jurisdiction exercised
by courts of equity in ordinaiy bills for partition, results chiefly
from the consideration that its jurisdiction .is exercised only concurrently with that of a Court of law; that it is a mere substitute
for the inconvenient remedy at law by Writ of partition, and the
measure of relief is, therefore, the same in both courts. But the
jurisdiction exercised by this court in the case now before it, is not
a concurrent, but an exclusive jurisdiction. The complainant stands
upon a pure equitable title, of which a Court of law would not take
cognizance at all, and in such cases, a court of conscience may
apply its own peculiar and established principles. One of the most
I Wisely vs. Findlay et al., 3 Rand. 361.
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cherished and valued of these principles is, the application of its
power to detect and eviscerate latent frauds and concealments which
the process of a court of law is not adapted to reach, and to relieve
against them. But even if the complainant had come into this
court with a clear legal title, I apprehend that the court would not
be precluded from opening the question of fraud in the actual stat6
of the pleadings in this cause. This case does not stand upon the
original and supplemental bills, and the answers thereto, but by
special leave of the court, the original defendants have filed crossbills, -impeaching the conveyances under which the complainants
claim for fraud. These cross-bills were filed many years since, and
the complainant, instead of demurring to them, as lie might well
have done if the question of fraud could not be investigated on'a
bill for partitio'n, has answered denying the fraud, the evidence has
been'taken to meet the issue arising on these pleadings, and" the
objection to the-jurisdiction of the court to investigate the whole
merits of. the ease, as it stands upon the pleadings and evidence,
raised for the first time in the argument at the bar, is not entitled
to the favorable consideration of the court. Judge Green says, in
the case last cited, that - a decree of partition would in nowise
prejudice the rights of the defendants, and intimates that they
would be entitled to relief in a Court of Equity, by a bill impeaching the conveyances on the ground of fraud. As the cross-billis.
in some sort, a substitute for an independent bill by the original
defendants, I cannot perceive why the same measure of relief may
not be afforded in thii form of proceeding.
I proceed to inquire, whether the defendants haie been successful
in their effort to invalidate the co.veyances under which the comThe first of these deeds, in the order of time, is
plainant claims. T
the deed from John Allen, and Hannah his wife, to the complainan
Vint, dated November 16th, 1810. The deed purports'- to convey
"Iall the right, title, property, interest, claim and demand which
the said John Allen and Hannah, his wife, have in the estate of
William King, the half-brotlier of the said Hannah, lately deceased,
the specific legacies in the will of the .said King to the said Hannah
and -her children only excepted, being one-eighth part, as well as
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one-fifth part of Samuel King's part in the estate of the said William King, deceased, which the said John Allen hath purchased
from the said Samuel King, the half-brother, &c." The reservation of the one-fifth part for the benefit of Daniel Sheffey will
be hereafter considered. The terms here used are very comprehensive. The deed was drawn by Andrew Russell, Clerk of Washington County, at the mutual instance of Allen and Vint/ Its
execution- by those parties is duly proved. Its execution also by
Mrs. Allen, in due form of law, on the same day on which it was
executed by the other parties, is shown. It was spread upon the
records of Washington County in May, 1811. Thus, everything is
regular on the face of the transaction; it is an executed contract,
and if the -deed was inoperative and void, it is because either no
valuable consideration moved from Vint to the grantors, 6r a 'consideration so. grossly inadequate as to amount to proof of fraud.
Both grounds are insisted on by the plaiiitiffs in, their cross-bills;
The deed having been regularly executed for the expressed con,
sideration of $18,901.27, the 14w presumes the transaction to have
been fair and bona fido until -the contrary be showri. Fraid is
never presumed by the law; it must always be"proved, -and the
r.nus is upon the party alleging it. Was any consideration paid by
Vint to Allen ? .It is proved by the 'depositions of Andrew Rfissell
and David. Stout, that recently before the execution of this deed
John Vint had in, his possession, at the house of the grantor Allen,
store goods of considerable amount. .-These goods were transferred
to Allen, and constituted, according to the statement of Allen, made
at the time of the contract the consideration of'the deed, except a
debt of $2000 previously due by Allen to Vint, which' was extinguished by the sale. We have no means of determining with acouracy, or even of making a reasonable approximation to the value of
these goods. But it is in :proof that the stock of goods was con,
siderable, that the shelves were well filled, and made a handsome
display., The whole of Vint's visible estate consisted in this stock
of goods, and after the sale he seems not to have been in possession
of property. There was, then, valuable consideration moving from
Yit to Allen to a considerable amount, but it is by no means clear
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that it amounted or approximated to the sum expressed in the deed.
It would seem from the affidavit of Vint, that the real consideration was hut $10,000, and that a larger sum was inserted
at the suggestion of Allen, to improve his credit with hit creditors
at the North! The conduct of Vint, in acquiescing in this fraudulent suggestion is wholly indefeasible; in foro consoientim, but as
between the parties themselves, and those claiming under them, it
does not vitiate the contract if an adequate consideration was in
truth paid. Assuming, then, that 810,000 was the actal consideration for the purchase, is this sum so grossly inadequate as to7 amount
to proof of fraud, vitiating the entire contract and renidering it null
and void?
This is confessedly a most delicate ground of equitable jurisdiction. Mere inadequacy of price, or any other inequality in the
bargain, is not to be understood as constituting, i'er ie, a ground t6
avoid a bargain in equity. For oourts of equity, as well -as courts
of law, act upon the ground that every person who is not, from his
peculiar condition or oiroumstaAces, under disability, is entitled to
dispose of his property in such manner and upon such terms as he
pleases, and whether his bargains are wise and discreet or otherwise,
or profitable or unprofitable; are considerations not for the courts of
justice, but for the party himself to deliberate upon. Yet there may
be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain as to demonstrate some gross -imposition or some undue influence, and in
such cases, courts of equity ought to interfere on the satisfactory
ground of fraud. But the inadequacy must be so gross as to shock
the conscience, and amount, in itself, to decisive evidence of fraud.1
If courts of equity were to undertake to unravel all the transactions
of men, and set aside all their improvident contracts as'void, they
would produce far-more mischief than they would correct. On the
ether hand, were they to refuse relief in such extreme cases as we
have supposed, fraud and chicanery would be unchecked, and equity
tribunals would become a mockery and a cheat. Such, then, being
their recognized and well established principles, I am now to apply
1 1 Story's Eq., a 244, 246.
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them to the transaction in question. Was the sum of $10,000 so
grossly inadequate a cotisideration for the one-eighth part of the
estate of William King as to constitute, per 8e, evidence of fraud?
To answer this question ihtelligently, we must recur to the circumstances under which this Contract was made. William King died
in October, .1808, leaving - colossal fortune, but he did not leave it,
or supposed he had not left it, subject to the disposition of the law
Far better had it been for the interests of his next of kin had he
done -so. -He made h will in which he supposed he had given a
direction to his splendid estate very different from that which the
law would have'given it. His half-brother and half-sister were not
peculiar objects of his bounty, for he had cut them off with veky
trifling pecuniary -kgacies. When the testator wrote his will he
was childless, and hit p'rimiiy' object seems to have been, in thb
event of his leaving no childreh of his own, to give hit vast estate
subject tO a very liberal provision for his wife and some ot.er favorite
relatives, to the issue of a marriage to be consummated betiveen his
nephew) William -King, sdn of his brother James, and 'a daughter
not then bbrn, of William Trigg, a brother of his wife, and'Rachel
Trigg Wife of William Tigg and hiece of the testator which issue
woula thus have initbd the blobd of his own family and of that of
his wife. The lahguage of his will is: "In case of having no
children, I 'then leave and bequeath all my real estate, at the death
of my wife, to William King, son of brother James King, on cn;dition of his niartying a daughtei of. William Trigg and my niece
Rachel, his wife, lately Rachel Findlay, in tiust for the eldest soi
or issue of said marriage: and in case said marriage should not take
place, I leave and bdqueati said estate to any child, giving prefer-.
ence to age, of said .William and Rachel Trigg that will marr7 a
child of iny brbthei James King's, or of 'sister Elizabeth's, wife of
John Mitchell, and'to their issue." There is no limitation over in.
the event of all these trusts taking effect. The testator seems not
to have contemplated the failure of all these marriages as within
the range of any reasonable probability, and yet, the trusts have all
failed. William and Rhchel Trigg have been long dead, never having had a daughter , and hone of the other contemplated marriages
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have as yet occurred. We now know how the Supreme Court have
expounded the obscure clause in the will of the testator quoted
above. They have said that the will clothed William King, son of
James, with the whole legal estate, but without any beneficial interest whatever,'in trust for persons not then in esse, and, as subsequent eventshiave shown, who have never yet come into being, ind
that no disposition of the equitable estate having been made by the
will, until it should vest by the occurrence of some one of the specified contingencies, a resulting trust remained in the heirs-at-law of
the testator. Now, in determining the question of inadequacy of
consideration, we must look to the actual state of things existing
when this contract was made, and we cannot fail to see that the
contract, on the part of Yint, was of an extremely hazardous tiature.
It was doubtful whether Hannah Allen* had any interest in the
estate, and if she had, the chances, humanly speaking, of its being
diverted by the occurrence of some one of the various contingeicies
specified, would seem to have greatly preponderated over the chances
of the failure of all. We have no standard furnished whereby we
can estimate the value of interests so precarious, and :without such
data to determine their value, it is impossible to say that the price
was grossly inadequate. My opinion, then, is, that the deed from
John Allen and wife to the complainant was founded upon a valuable
and sufficient consideration, and that this Court should not interfere
with its legal operation.
The effect of the subsequent contract of the 6th April, 1812, be.
tween John Allen and the complainaht, upon the rights of the parties, will be determined ufter deciding the question of the validity
or invalidity of the deed of January 1, 1811, from Sauel King
and wife to John Vint.
The last mentioned deed is also assailed by the heirs of the
grantor, Samuel King, and by Alexander Findlay, a pendente lite
purchaser from those heirs, in their answers and cross bill, as fraudulent and void. This deed is founded upon the expressed consideration of $10,000. It purports to convey to Vint "all the right,
title, property, interest, claim and demand which the said Samuel
King-and wife'now have in the estate of William King, the half-
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brother of said Samuel, lately deceased, the specific legacies only
excepted, the portion of the estate of the said William King hereby intended to be conveyed to the said John Vint, reserving onefifth of the estate which descended to his heirs or the said Samuel
King, it being already sold and conveyed to John Allen for his
trouble in carrying on the said suit as specified in a former conveyance, by John Allen and Hannah his wife, to said Vint." This
deed was acknowledged in the Clerk's office of Pulaski county,
Tennessee, on the 29th Januaty, 1811, by Samuel King and wife,
and admitted to probate, (the parties'residing in that county and
State,) but was not recorded in the Clerk's office of Washington
county, until 25th September, 1837. 'In his original bill the complainint alleges that the deed was made -to him by Samuel King
and wife for the consideration of. $10,000; in his supplemental bill
he says it was founded upon full and fair consideration. Are these
allegations true ? In the cross-bill filed by Alexander Findlay, it
is charged that the real consideration of. the deed was not ,10,000
as alleged, but 86,000; that the purchase xnoney'was to be paid in
ten annual instalments of $600 each, and that ten bonds were .executed by Vint to King for the amount of these instalments respectively; that nine of these bonds were in possession of Yint, and
that no part of the purchase money had ever been paid to Samuel
King. These allegations, except the last, are all admitted to be true
by Vint in his answer to the cross-bill, and the nine bonds are accordingly produced as exhibits. He avers that he had paid off these
bonds, but not to Samuel King. The amount is alleged to have
been paid to John Allen, King's brother-in-law, in a settlement between Vint and Allen, on the 6th April, 1812. Samuel King was"
then in his grave, having mysteriously disappeared in the :February
preceding, and being inevbr heard of more. - He had come from his
home in Kentucky to Abingdon, to draw the small annuity given him
by the will of his half-brother, William King, on. the express condition that he should apply for it in person. How did Allen acquire
possession of these bonds? That can never certainly be known.
Vint says he supposed he had acquired them fairly by some satisfactory arrangement between him and King. He did not suppose
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that they were in Allen's possession as King's agent to collect them,
for he says that he gave Allen credit on his own account for the
amount, and that they constituted part of the $11,600 for which
he gave his receipt to Allen on the 7th April, 1812. He supposed
that Allen had acquired the legal ownership of the bonds, as he
avers. Why, then, was there no endorsement on the bonds? With
his intifiiate knowledge of the circumstances and character of Allen,
he had no right to suppose that he had acquired them fairly by the
payment of valuable consideration. If Vint believed that the transaction was a fair one, why did.he subsequently go to Kentucky and
purchase the dower right of Samuel King's widow? If the transaction was fair she had no interest in the subject, for she had relinquished her dower right by joining her husband in the deed and
executing it with all due formality. The evidence abundantly shows
that no part of the purchase money was ever paid by either Vint
or Allen to King in his lifetime, or his representatives since. Wag
the contract of the 1st January, 1811, entered into in good faith
on the part of Vint? There is too much reason to believe the contrary. Samuel King was an incorrigible blotted drunkard. Some of
the witnesses say that they had never seen him in a fit tbndition to
transact biisiness. The character of John Allen Was singularly
infamous, anid he is the most prominent actor in the contract between
Vint and King, which resulted in the execution of the deed. The
contract, the bonds, the deed are all in his handwriting, and Vint
says in his affidavit that he bought Samuel King's interest froni
Allen. The transaction wears throughout the worst possible aspect,
-and I shall render a decree pronouncing the deed from Samuel
King and wife to Vint null and void, and, if necessary, :directing a
reconveyance from the heirs of Vint, or by a commissioner of the
Court specifically appointed for that purpose.
This conclusion, of course, renders it quite unnecessary to notice
that part of the argument of the counsel for Alexander Findlay-,
in which they aitempted to establish that even if this -deed should
be pronounced valid, the- language employed in the operative part
,of the deed wtid" equire tle Court t6 narrow its operation to
Samuel King's interest in 'the personal estate, or at least to exclude
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.from its operation the Salt Works property, of which partition
could not be demanded until after the death of the widow of William King. Having thus arrived at -the conclusion that the deed
frbm Allen and wife to Vint was valid, and that from Samuel King
and wife to Vint was null and void, it next becomes necessary to
determine what proportion of the estate of William King which
descended to his heirs at law, was conveyed by the first of those
deeds, and what fjroportion of the same estat*e the second deed purported to convey. In reference to the first questiou,.some, difficultj"
is produced from the apparent inconsistency between different parts
.of the deed. . The first of these apparently. conflicting clauses purports to convey the one-eighth part of the estate which had descended to the grantor, Hannah, as one of the heirs at law of her
half-brother, William King, ' as well as one-fifth part of Samuel
King's part in the- estate of the said- William King, which the said
John Allen hath purchased from the said Samuel King, the halfbrother of the said William King, deceased." The deed, then proceeds thus: "The one-fifth part of the interest of the said John
Allen and Hannah, his wife, either as heirs or as'.purehasers from
Samuel King, without the specific legacies, being reserved as a
compensation to Daniel Sheffey, Esq., for. his labor-and trouble as
counsel employed to recover said part of the estate of the said William King, as shall descend to the said John Allen and Hannah,.
his wife, either as heir to the said William King, or by purchase, as
aforesaid, from Samuel King." If the deed had gone no farther,
I should feel no difficulty in saying that it purported to convey -he
one-eighth and the one-fifth of an eighth of the whole estate, with
a declaration of trust as to the fith of an eighth'in favor of DanielSheffey But the following clause shows an explicit purpose to restrict the operative words of the conveyance to the one-eighth part
of the estate which descended to Mrs. Allen. The language is.
"The portion of the estate of the said William King, deceased,
hereby intended to be bargained, sold, and conveyed to the said
John Vint, being one-eighth part .of the estate which may descend
to his heirs." .This is sufficiently explicit, and as we are required
in the interpretation of all documents to expound them so that
47
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every part shall, if possible, take effect, I construe the deed in
question as conveying, and as purporting to convey to the grantee
only the one-eighth part of the estate of William King,.vhich descended to the grantor,. Hannah Allen, with a declaration of trust
in favor of Daniel Sheffey as to the fifth of an eighth, which fractional part was intended to be retained by John Allen, as trustee
for Daniel Sheffey. In pronouncing, therefore, the deed from
Allen and wife valid, as having a sufficient consideration to support
it, the grantee, Vint, becomes, by operation of the deed, invested
with the legal ownership of the one undivided eighth part of the
estate of William King, deceased, not specifically devised. But
the deed from Samuel King and wife to Vint, which has been annulled, only purported to convey four-fifths of the estate which descended to hini as heir at law, the deed in express terms "reserving
one-fifth of the estate which descended to Samuel King, it being
already sold and conveyed to John Allen for his trouble in carrying
on the said suit, as specified in a former conveyance by John Allen
and Hannah, his wife, to said Vint." The question, what .is the
effect of this recital, and whether it operates as an estoppel on
Samuel -King and his heirs, and all persons under him, mediately
or immediately, by title subsequently acquired, to deny the execution of the recited deed, is one of very grave moment, but I am of
opinion that this question cannot be properly decided in the present
state of the pleadings in this cause. The recital refers to a deed
from Samuel King to John Allen, the existence of which does not
otherwise appear than by the recital itself. If such a deed was
made, it is incumbent on the party claiming a benefit under it to
produce it; or, if it cannot be produced by reason of its loss, the
party seeking to set it up as a lost deed, must lay a proper foundation for preying its contents by showing its loss. That fact should
be distinctly put in issue by the pleadings. The Court cannot incidentally take cognizance of such a question. If Allen's heirs
seek to have the deed set up in equity, they must comply with the
terms which equity preseribes. They must bring their bill, alleging
the execution of the deed and its loss, and thus afford an opportunity to the heirs of the supposed grantor, or the purchaser from
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them, to contest the claim. Such an opportunity has not been
afforded to those parties by the pleadings in this cause.
The execution of such a deed, or its loss, is nowhere alleged by Allen's
heirs, either in their answer or cross-bill, while the fact of its execution is expressly denied by Alexander Findlay in his answer to
the complainant's bill. No attempt, then, having been made on the
part of Allen's heirs to set it up against the claimants under Samuel King, I cannbt inquire here into the effect of the recital in the
deed -from Samuel King io Vint, acknowledging the previous execution of the deed in question to John Allen. As the case now
stands, I must assume that the remaining one-fifth part of the
estate of William King, which descended to Samuel King, and
which was not embraced in the deed from Samuel King and wife to
Vint, was never conveyed by him, and consequently descended to
his heirs at law.
The next question presented for. solution is of no little difficulty
and perplexity.' The original bill was brought to secure to the
complainant the benefit of the two deeds from Allen and wife, and
Samuel King and wife, and it does not appear from that bill or the
supplemental bill, that there was any subsequent contract between
the plaintiff and any other party whereby the title acquired by the
plaintiff by operation of -the deeds, was lost, mddified, or in' anywise affected. This new phase of the case is put upon it by the
cross-bill-of the heirs of John Allen, and the ansiir to that crossbill by the. original -plaintiff, John Vint. A somewhat detailed
statement of these pleadings is necessaary to .the development of
the question which they pkesent for adjudication. The cross-bill
charges that the complainant, in filing his bill and supplementalbill, had fraudulently suppressed the important fact that, by a qontract between the complainant and John Allen, the ancestor of the
plaintiff in the cross-bill, subsequent to the execution of the deeds
from Allen and wife, and from Samuel King and wife to Vint,
dated April 6th, 1812, Vint had resold a moiety of the two shares
thus acquired, to Allen, for the price of $14,450 63; that $11,600,
part of the purchase money under this new contract, was paid by
Allen to Vint on the 7th April, 1812, evidenced by Vint's receipt
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of that date; and that the payment of the residue must be presumed after so great a lapse of time. The contract and receipt are
exhibited by the complainants with their cross-bill, and the alternative rayer is, that the Court will annul, by its decree, the deed
from Allen and wife to Vint of the 6th November, 1810; or, that
it shall compel Vint -to execute specifically his contract by a conveyance to the plaintiff of the moiety of the two shares sold by him
to -their ancestor; or, if the contract be rescinded, that the Court
render a decree directing Vint to refund the said sum of $11,600
with its accruing interest since April 7th, 1812.
The defendant Vint, in his answer, admits-that the contract of
April 6th, 1812, was entered into between himself and John Allen,
but insists that the contract was avoided by the failure of Allen to
comply with the condition on which Allen could call for a conveyance, viz: the payment of the purchase money within five years.
He denies that the said Allen or any other person, did pay to him
within five years after the date of the agreement, or at any other
time the said purchase money. He admits the execution of the
receipt to John Allen, of April 7th, 1812, for $11,600, but denies
that he did in fact receive of Allen the sum of money for which the
receipt was drawn. He specifies various items as composing the
aggregate sum mentioned in the receipt.' He says he distinctly
recollects, that as -part of the said sum of $11,600, he received
from John and.W. Allen their order upon John Jett, for $2,833,
which, when presented for payment, was protested by Jett, of
which refusal and protest Allen had notice. This order is filed as
an exhibit, with the answer, and the respondent avers that no part
of it was ever paid either by the drawers, drawee or any other person. The answer says in the second place, that the sum expressed
in the receipt was constituted in part of debts due by Vint, which
Allen assumed to pay for Vint, and which he had only partially
paid. Thirdly, the respondent says that the balance due by him to
Samuel King, of four or five thousand dollars on *account, of the
purchase mon~y for his.interest, -conveyed by the deed of January
1st, 1811, was settled by John Allen,.and that the sum was included
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in the sum of $11,600,'specified in the receipt. That before the
receipt was executed, Allen procured from Samuel King, and
handed over to Vint the notes which Vint had given to Samuel
King for the balance of purchase money due to him, and that the
amount so settled by Allen with King, was all 'that Vint ever realized on account of said receipt. The respondent repels; with
apparent indignation, the charge of fraudulent suppression of these
two papers, made by the plaintiffs in their cross bill, and says that
the chiarge cannot be true, since these papers were not retained by
him, but were handed over to their ancestor; and, as he and his
heirs were interested in 'these papers, he supposed that they would
take care of them, and at all times have them at their command.
Upon this state of the pleadings, several important questions are
evolved, which will be severally considered, though not in the precise order in which they are presented.
The profound silence of the complainant Vi, in his original and
supplemental bill, with reference to this subsequent contract between
Allen and himself is significant and- suspidious i and the excuse
alleged for it in his answer to the cross bill is not satisfactory. In
those bills, he asserts his legal and equitable right to demand that
the two shares of the estate of William King, of one-eighth each,
which had.descended respeetivelyto Simuel 'King and Hannah
Allen, should be .confirmed to him by virtue of the conveyance to
him of those shares, by the deeds of November 16th, 1810 and
January 1st, 1811, for which he says he had paid full and valuable
consideration. Assuming it to be true that he. had' paid the purchase money 'n full for Samuel King's share, yet, by his own showing, he had paid it to Allen and not to King. Now, Allen had
acquired those bonds given by Vint to King, fairly or siirreptitiously. If fairly, then Allen's heirs had a right to demand either
-specific execution of the contract of re-sale,'in consideration of the
part paymknt of the purchase monpey for which they were received
by Vint, or a recision of that contract of re-sale, and to have the
amount refunded by Vint: if surreptitiously, Samuel King's' heirs
had a right to demand either that. their ancestor's deed be annulled
as fraudulent, 'or that the stipulated purchase money be paid to
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them. Upon either hypothesis, the assertion of Vint in his bill,
that a perfect equitable right to both shares had vested in him, and
was a subsisting title at the time of the institution of his suit was
untrue, and I am constrained to think, therefore, that in claiming
the full benefit of his deeds, as executed contracts for which a full
consideration had been paid, he was guilty of a fraudulent purpose
in deliberately suppressing the fact, that the subsequent contract of
re-sale had been entered into, and partial payments made in virtue
of it. We might have charitably imputed his silence on this subject, to the fallibility of human memory, had he allowed us to do so.
But his silence proceeded, according to his pwn showing, not from
any lapse of memory, but from the persuasion that "as Allen and
his heirs were interested in said papers, he supposed that they would
take care of tliem, and at all times have them at their command."
The original actors in these transactions, had all been long dead,
except the complainant himself: twenty-six years had elapsed
before the filing of the bill, in the meantime the plaintiff Vint, had
made an absolute conveyance of the entire interest conveyed by
both the deeds, and obtained a reconveyance; and the conclusion
cannot be easily resisted, that in suppressing; not the papers, indeed,
but the facts which they disclose, the complainant took the chances
of profiting by the ignorance of the heirs of Allen, and the loss of
the evidence of their rights resulting from lapse of time. I do not
by any means intend to say that, even in a court of conscience, it
is in all cases incumbent on the plaintiff to assist his adversary in
making out his case. When the transactions are recent and the
actors in them living, the plaintiff in equity may well forbear to
state facts which may militate against his own title, knowing that
his adversary is cognizant of them, and may avail himself of them
in his defence. But where, as in the case at bar, the *original parties are all dead but the plaintiff himself, the willful suppression of
important facts, of which his adversaries can have no personal
knowledge, is v, fraud which deserves the severest animadversion of
the court. But however reprehensible such conduct may be, it cannot vitiate the original contract between the parties, which .must, as
I have already said, for reasons stated elsewhere in this opiion, be
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treated as a valid and executed contract, founded upon a sufficient
and valuable consideration. The remaining inquiries are in reference to the case made by the cross bill of Allen's heirs and the
answer of Vint: are the plaintiffs, heirs of John Allen, entitled to
demand specific execution of the contract of re-sale, of the 6th of
April, 1812? If not, what is the measure of relief to which they
are entitled ?
First, then, in elation to the prayer for specific execution. A
bill for specific execution of a contract is not entertained in equity
as a matter of right, but it is addressed to the discretion of the
court; not, indeed, to its arbitrary and capricious discretion, dependent upon the mere pleasure of the judge, but to that sound and
reasonable discretion which governs itself, as far as it may, by
general rules and principles; but, at the same time, which grants
or withholds relief, according to the circumstances of each particular case, when these rules and principles will not furnish any exact
measure of justice between the parties. On this account, it is not
possible to lay down any rules and principles which are of absolute
obligation and authority in all cases.' Let us see, then, the. terms
of the particular contract sought to be enforced here, and the circumstances under which the aid of this court is invoked to compel
its execution. There is no ambiguity in the terms of this agreement. It is an executory contract, by which Vint agrees, in consideration'of $14,450 63, to be paid to him by Allen, to make over
and convey to the children of Jobn and Hannah Allen, born and
to be born, one-half of all the interest which Vint acquired by the
conveyances from Allen and wife, of the 16th of November, 1810,
and from Samuel King and wife, of January 1st, 1811. It is.
further agreed that Allen and Vint shall contribute equal portions
of the expenses to be incurred in the prosecution of suits for the
recovery of the estate, but that until the payment by Allen to Vint,
of the stipulated purchase money, Vint shall not be compelled to
convey the moiety thus sold to the children of John anal Hannah
Allen, and that if Allen should fail to pay the purchase money to
'Story's Eq-dity,
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Vint, for the period of five years from the date of the contract, the
agreement shall be void and of no effect. On the day following the
execution of this agreement, Vint executed his receipt to Allen for
611,600, in part payment of the purchase money, and there is no
evidence in the cause of any other payment being made by Allen,
unless the payment of the residue may be reasonably presumed
after so great a lapse of- time. But I am of opinion that the insolvency of Allen, which is abundantly established by the depositions
of several witnesses, from a period anterior to the date of this contract until his death, completely repels any such presumption.
There has not, then, been: a full performance by Allen of the
contract on his part, and the question to be decided on this branch
of the case is, do the heirs of Allen occupy a position here, entitling
them to demand a specific execution of the contract on the part
of Vint, by a conveyance of the moiety of the estate held by him,
under the deeds from Allen and wife, and from Samuel King and
wife ? By reference to the terms of the contract, we perceive an
express stipulation, that if Allen did not pay the purchase money
within five years from the date of the contract, the contract itself
should lie void and of no effect. As the whole purchase.money was
not paid within the prescribed period, according to the strict terms
of the contract, it became void. Was time, -then, of the essence of
this contract ? If it was, this court ought not to decree its specific
execution at the suit of a party who has failed to comply with it
within the period prescribed by its terms; if not, specific execution
may be decreed, though there has not been full performance of the
contract on the part of the party seeking its enforcement. Time is
not generally deemed in equity, to be of the essence of the contract,
unless the parties have expressly so treated it, or-it necessarily follows from the nature and circumstances of the contract. 1 Ordi-"
narily, 'the non-payment of money by a stipulated day,, is not,
per 8e, sufficient to defeat the claim of a party to specific execution
of the contract, since interest will compensate the defendant for the
delay, and equity relieves against'forfeitures, whenever it can make

12 Story's Equity,
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adequate compensation. The case of a mortgage well illustrates
the doctrines of equity on this subject. The general intention of
the parties in entering, into such a contract, being a mere security
for money, equity, looking rather to this general intention than to
the strict terms of the mortgage deed, relieves against the forfeiture
by allowing the defaulting debtor to redeem, on condition of his paying interest upon the debt, so long as the payment of the interest
has been withheld. In this and all similar cases, interest is deemed a
full c~mpensation to the creditor, but where the object of the contract
is a sale, and not a mere security for a debt, and the parties hare
expressly stipulated that unless payment of the purchase money be
made by an- ascertained day, the executory contract shall be
null and void, there is no room for speculation as to the intention
of the parties. They must be held to mean what they have clearly
expressed, and to compel a conveyance by the vendor at the suit of
a vendee who had not paid or tendered the purchase money according to the terms of the contract, would in truth be, not the enforcement of the contract between the parties, hut the assumption of
authority by a court of equity to make a contract for the pprties
which they have not made for themselves. "I do not see, therefore," says Baron Alderson,'in a similar case, "why, if the parties
choose, even arbitrarlly, provided both of them intend so to do, to
stipulate for a particular thing to be done at a particular time, such
a stipulation is not to be carried literally into effect in a court of
equity. This is the real contract. The parties had a right to make
it; why, then, should a court of equity interfere to make a new
contract, which the parties have not made? It seems, to me, therefore, that the conclusion at which Sir Edward Sugden, in his valu-able treatise on this subject has arrived, is founded in law and gpod
sense." I I think, then, that the parties here have chosen, by the
express terms of their contract, to treat time as of its essence, and
that this court has no power to decree its specific execution. But
if this were doubtful, there are obvious considerations Why the
court, in the exercise of that sound discretion to which such bills
1Opinion of Alderson B., cited in a note to 2d Story's Eq.,
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are always addressed, should refuse to render any such decree.
The party seeking the specific execution of a contract, must himself be guilty of no laches. In the language of the books, he must
show that lhe has proceeded without unreasonable delay, and, that he
has been "ready, desirous, prompt and eager to perform the contract."
This consideration would be fatal to the pretensions of plaintiffs
who bring their bill more, than a quarter of century after the date
of their ancestor's contract. The impolicy and injustice of entertaining such bills after a great lapse of time, and the consequent
changes wrought in the relations of the parties, and of the subject
of the contract could not be better illustrated* than by the circumstances attending the case at bar. At the date of this contract,
the extent of the interest of Vint in the estate of William King,
assuming that both his deeds were valid, was involved in very great
doubt. It depended upon the construction to be afterwards placed
by the courts on the will of William King, and on this subject conflicting views were entertained by the most learned lawyers. But
even if there had been no controversy on this point, there was a
strong probability that some of the limitations of the will might
become .vested, by the happening of some one of the contingencies,
on the occurrence of which the resulting trust in the heirs at law
would be divested and defeated. The state of things then existing
had wholly changed when this cross bill was filed. The defeat of
that resulting trust had then beeome, if not absolutely impossible,
certainly altogether improbable. To decree specific execution under
such circumstances would be to place the vendee and his heirs on
more favorable ground than they would have occupied if they had
shown themselves "ready, desirous, prompt and eager to perform
the contract." A court of equity will never allow a party to derive
an advantage from.his own laches. On the whole, I am well satisfied
that the heirs of John Allen, the complainants in this cross bill, do not
occupy a position entitling them to demand of John Vint, specific
execution of his contract with their ancestor, and that this prayer
of their bill must be denied.
But it is equally clear, that the alternative prayer of the .bill that
the contract be rescinded, and the purchase -&oneypaid by Allen,
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be refunded by Vint, must be granted whenever the party entitled
to receive it is before the court. That party is the personal representative, and not the heirs of John Allen, and he is not a party to
this suit. There cannot, therefore, be a decree for a payment of
this money until the personal representative is before the court, and
until he is made a party; it might seem premature to decide any
other question in reference to this fund. But as the parties beneficially interested in the question are already in court, I deem it not
irregular to state my views in reference to the decree which it will
be proper to render when the personal representative is formally
made a party. For what sum, then, should a decree be ultimatly
rendered in favor of the personal representative of Allen against
Vint's representatives? This is a question bn which I have felt
great embarrassment and difficulty. It is insisted, on the dne hand,
that a decree should
ie
rendered for $11,600, the sum expressed
in the receipt from Vint to Allen, of April 7, 1812, with interest
from that date. On the other, it is denied that the sum of money
expressed in the receipt, or any part thereof, was paid, - The execution of the receipt being admitted, it must certainly be regarded
as prima facie evidence of the payment,' and the question arising
here is, has the presumption of payment which the law raises from
the execution of the receipt been repelled by the evidence in the
cause? In his answer to the cross bill, Vint denies that the money
was in fact paid, and avers that the sum specified in the receipt was
compounded in part of two large items, viz: nine of the bonds
given by Vint to Samuel King, which -were surrendered to him by
Allen, each for $600, payable in instalments at a future day, and
a draft of J. &W. Allen, on John Jett, for. $2,338, which provedto be wholly unproductive. The bonds and draft are both produced
by Vint, with his answer. If the allegations be true, Vint would,
of course, be entitled to a credit against his receipt, of these
amounts. But no diseovery is sought in the cross bill from Yint,
whether he had in fact received the sum specified in the receipt,
and the above recited allegations. of his answer, not being respon'3 Starkie on Ev., 1273-4.
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sive to the bill, are not evidence that can avail the respondent. We
must look,- then, to the evidence in the cause, other than the answer of Vint, to determine whether the presumption of payment
has been successfully repelled. The notorious insolvency of Allen,
at the date of this receipt, and his consequent inability to pay any
considerable sum; the fact of the possession of the bonds by Vint,
which he had previously given to Samuel King for the purchase
money of his intefest; the reduced circumstances of Vint, after as
well as before the date of the receipt: and the possession of the
draft on Jett from J. & W. Allen, bearing even date with the receipt,
are all circumstances tending to prove, either that the sum specified
in the receipt was not paid at all by Allen, or that it was not paid
in money. These circumstances are calculated to throw a deep
shade of suspicion upon the bona fides of the whole transaction,
but are not deemed sufficient to warrant me in pronouncing, with
the imperfect lights now before me, the whole transaction to be
fraudulent and fictitious. In this state of obscurity and indefiniteness of the evidence in the cause, I shall direct proper issues to be
made up and tried by a jury, to determine the question whether
any, and if any, what payments were made by John Allen to John
Vint, in part execution of- the executory Dontract of sale between
those parties of April 6, 1812; and whether the nine bonds produced by Vint we're delivered by Allen to him, and whether the
amount appearing due by them constituted part of the sum of
$11,600 specified in Vint's receipt; and lastly, whether the draft
for $2,833, purporting to have been drawn by J. & W. Allen in
favor of Vint on John Jett, was delivered to Vint by Allen in part
payment of the sum specified in the same receipt, and whether it
was paid by Jett or no?
The remaining question for consideration is the elaim of the personal representative, widow and heirs of Daniel Sheffey, against the
heirs of John and Hannah Allen. The representatives of Sheffey
by their cross-bill insist: 1. That they are entitled to the one-fifth
of one-eightlj of the estate of William King, deceased, in virtue of
the reservation made in favor of Daniel Sheffey by the deceased
from John Allen and wife to John Vint, of Noyember 16, 1810.
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2. That they are entitled to payment of a bond for $600, bearing
date January 1, 1811, executed by John Vint to S. King, and
assigned by John Allen to Daniel Sheffey. 3. That they Are entitled to payment of the residue of sundry debts, evidenced by a
deed of trust executed by John and William Allen to Benjamin
Estill, in trust to secure the payment of said debts to Daniel Sheffey,
bearing date August 30, 1811. These demands will be severally
considered.
1. The deed from John Allen and wife to John Vint, of the 16th
November, 1810, contains a reservation in favor of Daniel Sheffey,
in the following words: "One-fifth part of the interest of the said
John Allen and Hannah, his wife, either as heirs or by purchase
frond Samuel King, without the specific legacies, being reserved as
a compensation to Daniel Sheffey, Esq., for his labor and tfouble as
counsel employed to recover such part of the estate of William King
as shall descend to said John Allen and Hannah, his wife, either as
heirs, of the said William King or by purchase as aforesaid from
Samuel King. The portion of the estate of the said William King
hdreby intended to be conveyed to the said John Vint being oneeighth part of the estate which may descend to his heirs." I have
already stated my opinion to be, that the deed from Allen and wife
to Vint was to be construed as conveying the whole of the one-eighth
part of the estate of William King which descended to the female
grantor, Hannah. The reservation in the deed must, therefore, be
held to apply to the one-fifth of. the one-eighth of William King's
estate, amounting, to one-fortieth of the whole estate,-which the
deed states by way of recital to have been previously purchased by
John Allen of Samuel King. No deed from Sanuel King to John •
Allen conveying this fractional interest is produced. The deed from
S. King and wife to Vin recited that such conveyance had been
made, and those two recitals constitute the only evidence in the
cause of its execution. The heirs of S. King and J. Allen are both
made defendants in the cross-bill filed by the representatives of
Sheffey, and in presenting my view of this cause I shall assume that
the first, and all claiming under them, are estopped by the recital
in the deed of. Samuel King from denying the execution of the
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recited deed, and that the heirs of Allen are estopped from denying that the reservation in the deed of their ancestor created a trust
infavdr of Daniel Sheffey, which a court of equity might enforce by
compelling a conveyance. This hypothesis is most favorable to
Sheffey's representatives, and concedes to them all that has been
claimed on their behalf. The trust .thus arising presupposes the
existence of a contract between Allen and Sheffey as the foundation
of the trust; the -contract itself is not produced, and the administrator of Sheffey has made affidavit that he has made diligent search
for it among the papers of the intestate, but without success. In
order to determine the character of this contract, we must refer to
the reservation in the deed from Allen and wife, which I have
quoted above. The reservation of the one-fortieth part of the
estate is made "as a compensation to Daniel Sheffey, Esq., for his
labor and trouble as counsel employed to recover such part of the
estate, &c." The clear conclusion deducible from this language is,
that a contract had been made between the parties, whereby Allen
had stipulated that, in consideration of professional services to be
rendered by Sheffey in successfully asserting the title of Allen alid
wife as -heirs-at-law to one-eighth of the estate of William King, the
one-fortieth of said estate should enure to the benefit of Sheffey. I
say succes fully asserting, because unless the effort was successful,
the fund or subject from which Sheffey's beneficial interest was to,
arise would itself fail. The estate, then, must be recovered before
any beneficial interest would enure to Sheffey. Itpresents the
common case of a contract between counsel and client for a contingent fee. The consideration of the contract was the recovery,
through the learning and ability of the counsel, of the proportionate
share of the estate which tILlaw was supposed to have cast by descent upon the wife of the other contracting party, as one of the
heirs-at-law of William King. Was the contract performed by
Daniel Sheffey ? The record of the chancery suit instituted at
Staunton, in 1809, by Daniel Sheffey, on behalf of Allen and wife,
and of Samuel King, 'against the personal representatives, widow
and the other heirs-at-faw of William King, is exhibited a.s part of
the cross-bill filed in this cause by Sheffey's representatives. The
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bill of the complainants in that suit, drawn by Daniel Sheffey, bears
unquestionable evidence of the sagacity, acuteness and learning of
that eminent lawyer. It was insisted that the devise to William
King, son of James, on condition of his marrying a daughter of
William and Rachel Trigg, and in trust for the issue of said marriage, was too remote and uncertain, and therefore void; that the
subsequent contingent limitations were also void, for the same reason; and that all the limitations of the will, except those for the
benefit of the testator's wife apd other specific legatees, having
failed, the estate descended to the testator's heirs-at-law, as in caqes
of intestacy.. This construction of the will prevailed with the Chancellor, and in 1816 an interlocutory decree was pronounced, declaring "that under existing .circumstances, as disclosed in the
supplemental bill And answers, the inheritance of the testator's real
estate does not pass by-said will, but descends to those who are entitled thereto by law." It is a most singular fact, that after obtaining so strong an expression of the Chancellor's opinion in favor bf
the rights of his clients, Mr. Sheffey failed to prosecute the case to
a final decree. The last order in the cause was made in 1817, and
in 1821 it was struck from the docket, and no subsequent effort was
made to have it reinstated. Nor do we find any evidence in the
record that Mr. Sheffey ever afterwards appeared as counsel for his
original clients. In the action of ejectment subsequently brought,
on the law side of this Court, by William King, son of James,
against Findlay & Mitchell, Mr.'Sheffey appeared as counsel for
the defendants, who had a common interest with the other heirs-atlaw of William King, the elder. The lessor of the plaintiff.recovered
judgment,. and the case was carried by writ of error to the, Supreme.
Court. Mr. Sheffey argued the cause before that tribunal on behalf
of the plaintiffs in error. 'The Supreme Court atfrmeil the jadgment
of this Court, thus deciding that the will of William King the elder
invested William King the younger with the legal title to the estate,
but expressly waiving the decision of the question whether he took
any beneficial interest in it. The original defendants in the action
of ejectment applied for andobtained from this Court an injunction
restraining the.lessor of the plaintiff from enforcing his judgment at
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law. The bill alleged that though the legal title was in William
King, he was a naked trustee for the heirs-at-law, and had no beneficial interest in the estate. The other heirs-at-law were made
defendants, and partition was prayed among them of the real estate
of William King. This bill, too, was drawn by Mr. Sheffey, and
its preparation was one of the last acts of his distinguished professional career. It was filed in 1830, and its author died very shortly
afterwards. It was strongly insisted by the able counsel for his
representatives, in their argument at the bar, that though Mr. Sheffey had abandoned the chancery suit instituted at Staunton for the
special benefit of Allen and wife, and of Samuel King, yet that he
had. by no means abandoned their cause, and that he had as effectually served them in the subsequent suits referred to above, as if
he had appeared specially as their counsel; and that as the suit for
partition brought by him has resulted in the establishment of their
title to partition as heirs-at-law, he has virtually fulfilled his contract with them, and his representatives are entitled to reap the
long deferred reward of his services. It is certainly of little consequence in a Court of Equity, which regards substance rather than
form, whether Mr. Sheffey recovered the estate for these clients,
in the avowed character of their counsel, -or in the character of
counsel for other parties having a common interest in them, and
standing in the same relation to the subject of partition, provided.
it was equally his purpose to serve them both. But the record
abundantly proves that in abandoning their suit in the State
Chancery Court at Staunton, Mr. Sheffey abandoned, and intended
to abandon the cause of his original clients and his contract with
them also. He believed that Hannah Allcn and Samuel King were
unnaturalized aliens, and thisfact is distinctly avowed in the billfor
partition filed by him just before i8 death! There can be no
doubt that Mr. Sheffey died under the firm conviction that no title
by descent had been cast upon his former clients in consequence of
their alienage, and he avowed that for this reason, their children
who we born ii Virginia; apd not themselves, were heirs at law of
William King. They were accordingly made defendants in thesuit
brought for partition. It was not known till long after Sheffey's
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death, that the father of HannahAllen and of Samuel King was a
nuturalized citizen of the United States; and we have seen that
the naturalization of Thomas King operated by virtue of the Act
of Congress of 1802, the naturalization of his minor children who
were in the United States when the Act of Congress took effect.
If the title, then, of those children as heirs at law of their half
brother William .King has at length been established,- the result is
due to causes other than to the efforts of their former counsel in
their behalf. The unfortunate misapprehension under which that
counsel labored with regard to the rights of these persons, satisfactorily accounts for his abandonment of their suit, and I am constrained to say that, in my judgment, it is none the less fatal to
the pretensions of his representatives that his course was dictated
by an ignorance of facts which seems generally to have prevailed,
and which was probably shared by the parties most interested in
the question.
2. The claim of the representatives of Sheffey to have a decree
for satisfaction of the bond for $600, executed by Vint to Samuel
King, and assigned by John Allen to Sheffey, may be disposed of
in a summary manner. The assignment of the bond constituted
Sheffey a mere creditor at large, of 'Vint. No judgment was ever
obtained or suit prosecuted by Sheffey, either against Vint, the
obligor, or Allen, the assignor of the bond. Nor is any sufficient
reason assigned for failing to prosecute a suit at law. It is averred
in the bill, that- after the assignment, Vint being a resident of
Tennessee, the bond was sent by Sheffey to. an attorney in that
State, for the purpose of'having it collected, but that Vint being
supposed to be insolvent, no suit was ever brought upon it. Without a judgment at law binding the lands of the debtor, equity has
no jurisdiction to entertain the bill -of a creditor filed to set aside
a fraudulent conveyance of the debtor's lands, or to enable the
creditor to reach the mere equitable estate of the debtor. The
judgment lien is the necessary foundation of the equitable jurisdiction in either case, and equity lends its aid to make that lien effectual
whenever it cannot be enforced b7 execution at 'law. I will not
here examine the cases involving this familiar doctrine, but will con48
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tent myself with referring to two treatises on equity where the
cases are reviewed, and the doctrines of equity on this subject are
fully discussed.' It is clear, then, that no decree can be rendered
in favor of Sheffey's representatives against the obligor Vint, for
the amount of this bond. Nor have they a demand against the
representatives of the assignor Allen, which can be asserted here.
A brief view of the relation between the assignor and assignee of a
chose in action, will make this manifest. The law implies mutual
contracts between the parties, from the mere fact of assignment.
On the part of the assignee, it implies an engagement to prosecute
the demand against the maker or obligor with due diligence, and
nothing short of the prompt prosecution of the demand to judgment and execution will, ordinarily, satisfy the requirements of the
law so as to give the assignee recourse against the assignor. A
suit against the maker is not, indeed,-in all cases, a necessary prerequisite to fix the liability of the assignor, as where the maker is
notoriously insolvent, and perhaps, too, where he resides beyond
the jurisdiction of the courts of the State. 2 The contract implied
on the part of the assignor is, that if the assignee proceeds with
due diligence, and yet fails to make the demand against the maker
effectual, the assignor will refund to the assignee the price paid for
the chose; but even here, the foundation of the assignee's right
being but a simple contract, it must be prosecuted within five years,
or it will be barred by the statute of limitations. Now, assuming
that the notorious insolvency of the obligor Vint, and his residence
in another State, were, either of them, sufficient to dispense with the
necessity of a suit against him in order to fix the liability of the
assignor, the assignee's demand was not prosecuted at law at all,
nor here, within the period prescribed by .the statute of limitations,
which, having been pleaded here, constitutes a bar to a recovery.
3. The claim to satisfaction of the debts due by John Allen to
Daniel Sheffey, to securc which, the deed of trust of August 80th,
1811, from John aind William Allen,:,was executed, except so far as
they were reduced by the application of the proceeds of sale by the
' 2 Rob. Pr. 18, 19, and 47, 48, and 2 Story's Eq.
Drane v8. Scolfield, 6 Leigh's Rep. 386.

2
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trustee Estill, is liable to the same objection that, with reference to
that residuum of debt, Sheffey was a mere creditor at large. The
bill is not filed for the purpose of removing obstructions to the title
of any property conveyed by that deed, but to enable the plaintiffs
to subject the equitable estate of John Allen in a different subject.
This claim is deemed invalid for another reason. The deed of trust
of August 30th, 1811, was executed, not by John Allen alone, but
by John and William Allen jointly, conveying property held jointly
by them, to secure the payment of debts due by them jointly.
William Allen, or his representatives, are not made parties to this.
suit. This should have been done for non constat, but that the
debts have been satisfied by him. Waiving, therefore, all objections.
to this claim arising from the staleness of the demand, I am of7
opinion that equity has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
Upon thQ whole case, I am of opinion that the plaintiffs in this.
cross-bill, the representatives of Sheffey, are not entitled to the relief
which they seek, and that their bill be dismissed with costs.
A decree was rendered in conformity with this opin.ion.

In thZe Suyreme Court 'of Ilexa8. .A4peal from Cass County..
LANDER vs. THE STATE.
1. Testimony must be pertinent to the issue, or it is inadmissible-hence, theaccused cannot give in evidence, under an indictment for homicide, what he, did
not say, when no question has been asked as to what he did say.
2. Previous threats, unconnected with any manifestation at the time of the killing, ,
of an intention to carry them into immediate execution, will not extenuate the
crime of a deliberate ltdmicide committed in cold blood by one laying in wait
purposely to take the life of his adversary, even if the motive which actuated the
slayer was the preservation of his own life from apprehended violence from thedeceased; but such killing is murder in the first degree.
3. The rule as to self-defence in 2 Stark. Ev. 721, 1 Russ. on Crimes, 661, Whart..
Am. Crim. Law, 254, 1st ed., 385, 2d ed., otated and shown to be the true rule.-

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WHEELER,

J.-To reverse the judgment of conviction, it ii:
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urged that the Court erroneously excluded evidence proposed by
the accused; and also that there is error in the charge of the
Court.
The attorney for the State had asked a witness how the accused
equipped" as he rode into Jefferson with the witness, on the
was "C
morning of the day of the killing. To which the witness answered
that "he had pistols tied to his saddle," and the defence thereupon
proposed to prove by the witness that the accused "uttered no
hostile expressions about the deceased, and spoke of no difficulty
with any one," which, upon objection, the Court excluded; and
this is assigned as error.
The attorney for the State had not questioned the witness as to
any statements or conversations of the accused on that occasion.
And yet it is insisted that the accused had the righ to prove that
he did not at that time use threatening language, or give expression
to any hostile intentions toward the deceased. The proposition
was to prove what the accused did not say, when there had been
no question asked as to what he did say. It is scarcely necessary
to say that a party could not thus make evidence for himself; that
the testimony proposed was irrelevant; did not conduce to prove
any fact pertinent to the issue, was no part of the res gestce; nor
of a conversation drawn out by the examination on the part of the
State; and was clearly inadmissible.
Other similar questions upon the admissibility of the evidence
were reserved; but they are not deemed of a character to require
more particular notice. And, indeed, the only matter presented
by the record which does require notice, is the part of the charge
of the Court which is complained of, in which the Court treated of
the effect of the previous threats of the deceased. On that subject,
the Court charged that "if the defendant, not being moved by a
wicked and malicious intent, but from a just and well grounded
apprehension, for the preservation of his own life from a threatened
attack from the deceased, inflicted the mortal wound by which death
ensued, then he is guilty of murder in the second degree, and not
murder in the first degree."
By a "1threatened attack," it is evident the -Court meant the
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previous threats of the deceased. The Judge could have meant,
and the jury. could have understood him to mean, nothing else; for
there was no pretence of an attack or threatened attack by the
deceased at the time of the killing. Divested of the peculiar
phraseology which obscures its meaning-that is, the expressions
"not from wicked and malicious intent," "well grounded apprehension," and "threatened attack," and viewed in reference to the fact
of the case-the" legal proposition which this charge announces is,
that previous threats, of themselves, and unconnected with any
manifestation at the time of the killing, of an intention to carry
them into immediate execution, will extenuate the crime and penalty
of a wilful, premeditated and deliberate homicide, committed in
cold blood, by one laying in wait purposely to take the life of his
adversary; if the motive which actuated the slayer was tle preservation of his own life from future, and of course, contingent danger,
apprehended by violence from the deceased. Or, in other words,
that bare, naked threats, unconnected with acts, may extenuate and
reduce the crime of murder, committed by a "premeditated and
deliberate killing," which the statute defines to be murder in the
first degree,- to murder in the second degree.
The annunciation of such a proposition from the B-ench is calculated to arrest attention. And it is natural to inquire upon what
principle it is that this effect is ascribed to previous threats. It cannot be on the ground that they.constitute what the law deems a
sufficient provocation to extenuate the guilt of homicide. For that
can never be where the killing is deliberate, .or of cool purpose.
That is the indulgence which the law extends to the first transport
of passion, in condescension to human infirmity, to the furor brevis,
which, while the freizy lasts, renders a man deaf to the voice of
reason. And "it is the nature of the provocation, and not the
mere effect of it on the mind of the prisoner, which the law regards."
2 Stark. Ev. 722. Therefore, "no affront by bare words orgestures,
however false or malicious, and exaggerated with the most provoking
circumstances, will free the party killing from the guilt of murder,"
(1 Russell on Or. 514) where such provocation does not immediately
lead to blows, or a mutual combat in which the homicide ensues.
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Id. 527. Whart. Am. Cr. L. 237, 238. And the plea of provocation will in no case avail, where there is evidence of express malice,
(1 Russell on Cr. 520) and it does not appear that the party killing
acted upon such provocation. For in all cases of provocation, in
order to extenuate the offence, it must appear that the party killing
acted upon such provocation, and not upon an old grudge." Whart.
Am. Cr. L. 242. "The provocation which is allowed to extenuate
in the case of homicide must be something which a man is conscious
of, which he feels and resents at the instant the act which he would
extenuate is committed." 1 Russell Or. 513-14, Fost. 315.
It could not have been intended to invoke any principle of the
law upon the subject of provocation, as having any, the remotest
application to the case before the Court; or to rest the doctrine
asserted as to the effect of previous threats upon this ground. For
if there had been what the law regards as provocation sufficient to
extenuate the crime, it could not have been murder of either degree;
but would be manslaughter only.
There is, if it were possible, even less, certainly not more, reason
in the law, for holding mere naked threats unconnected with acts
to amount to the justification or excuse of homicide on -the plea of
self-defence. This defence proceeds on the ground of the Judtification
or excuse, not the mere extenuation of homicide. It does not'
extenuate, or reduce from one degree of crime to another, but it
wholly acquits of crime. Mere threats can never afford a justification
or excuse for the commission of unlawful acts; nor, of themselves,
justify an attack, or even an assault; much less a killing by laying
in wait with a deadly weapon. The right of self-defence rests upon
the law of necessity. It is the natural and inalienable right of
every human being; and it is to be held sacred and inviolable by
any law of human or civil institution. It does not depend upon
any law of society. It is derived from a higher source; is coeval
with man's natural being; and hence it is with truth and reason
said; that self-preservation is the first law of nature. "Self-defence,
therefore, (says Blackstne) as it is justly called the primary law of
nature, so it is not, neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law
of society." 3 B1. 4. It may be rightfully exercised by every
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human being, whether beneath &despot's rule, or on freedom's soil;
whether he exists in a heathen land, or breathes beneath a Christian
sun. But still, it is a law of necesszty; and while, in its just and
proper exercise it places the subject of it above and beyond the
influence of the civil or municipal law, renders him irresponsible for
his acts done by its permission, and not amenable to the civil
authority; yet it has its limit, as well defined as is the limit of any
right which a man may exercise in subordination to the, laws of
society; and that limit is where the necessity which gave the right
ceases. The necessity and the right are from their nature coextensive and concurrent. Where the necessity arises, the right
instantly accrues; and when the necessity ceases, the right no
longer exists. There is no difficulty in comprehending what is to
be understood by the right of self-defence; and if none wer6 disposed
to transgress its bounds, there would have been no necessity for the
enacting of laws for the prevention of wicked, malevolent and
vindictive violence ; or the wanton exercise of a cruel, revengeful
and malignant spirit, the natural fruits of a heart regardless of
social duty, and fatally bent upon mischief. But experience has
shown that laws were necessary to ascertain and prescribe the true
limit of the rightful 'exercise of this right of self-defence; and to.
restrain and punish the transgressor. The rules and principles
which the law has recognized, and which it enforces, do not undertake to restrain a man's natural right; but they afford it their
necessary shield and protection, by the restraints which they impose
on those who wotuld abuse its exercise, and under the cover and
pretence of self-defence, seek occasion for the indulgence of a spirit
of malevolence, cruelty and revenge. Those rules and principleshave their foundatioi'in the law of nature; they are incorporated
into and form a component part of the common law; are sanctioned
by the wisdom and approved by the experience of ages; they form
the best exponent of the nature of the right; ind in an undeviating
adherence to them, is to be found the best and only sure guaranty
for the protection and preservation of the natural and inalienable
right of self-defence, which human wisdom has conceived, or can
devise. And whenever they shall be relaxed or departed from, it
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will impair the estimate of the sanctity of human life, induce a
loose estimate of its value, and tend to a state of society in which
licentious, wanton violence may go unrestrained, brute force usurp
the prerogative of the law, and every man become the avenger of
his own wrongs; when no right of person or property may be
esteemed sacred and inviolable, or will be enjoyed in security.
It is the necessary consequence of the right of self-defence, and
therefore it is the universally received principle and maxim of the
law, that "a man may repel force by force in the defence of his
person, habitation, or property, against one or many who manifestly
intend and endeavor, by violence or surprise, to commit a known
felony on either. In such a case he is not obliged to retreat, but
may pursue his adversary till he find himself out of danger; and if,
in a conflict between them, be happeneth to kill, such killing will
be justifiable. Whart. Am. Cr. L. 254. *But "to justify a homicide
on the ground of self-defence, it must clearly appear that it was a
necessary act, in order to avoid death or some severe calamity."
2 Stark. Ev. 721; 1 Coxe, 424. Or, from the nature of the attack
which he is forced to repel, the party killing must have had reasonable ground of belief that there was a design to destroy his life or
do him some great bodily harm. Whart. Cr. L. 258, 259-60. And
"in all cases of homicide excusable by self-defence, it must be taken
that the attack was made upon a sudden 6ccasion, and not premeditated or with malice." 1 Russ. 661. "A force which the defendant
has the right to resist, must itself be within striking distance. It
must be menacing, and apparently able to inflict physical injury,
unless prevented by the resistance he opposes." .Peoplevs. .McLeod,
1 iHll, 420; Whart. 260. The belief that a person designs to kill
me, it was said in a late case in North Carolina, will not prevent
my killing him fropm being murder, unless he is teaking 'some attempt
to execute his design, or, at least is in an apparent situation to do
so, and thereby induces me reasonably to think that he intends to
do it immediately." Id. 4 Iredell, 469. "The right of resorting
to force upon the principle-of self-defence, does not arise while the
apprehended mischief exists in machination only." Whart. 260.
"No contingent necessity will avail; and 'whe.n the pretended
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necessity consists of the as yet unexecuted machinations of another,
the defendant is not allowed to justify himself by reason of their
existence." Id. 255; 1 Hill, N. Y. R. 377; 3 Iredell, 186.
There is and can be no pretence that the facts of the present
case bring it within any of these rules, which ascertain and mark
the limit of the lawful exercise of the right of self-defence. There
is no dispute about the. facts. The accused was not the party
attacked. He was the assailant, not the deceased. There is no
pretence of an attack or threatened attack from the latter, present
and impending over the accused at the time of the commission of
the homicide. The accused was the sole aggressor on that occasion.
There, was at the time no danger, and could have been no apprehension of'present danger from the deceabed; and of course there
was and could be no present necessity, or well grounded belief of
the existence of a present necessity of taking his life by the accused
for the presbrvation of his own life. The accused did not act on
the defensive. Instead of endeavoring to avoid the necessity, he
sought the occasion.. Being apprised of the threats of the deceased,
he deliberately went about compassing his destruction. 1le prepared for the occasion; unobserved watched, or was apprised of the
movements of the deceased-was under no necessity of encountering and did not encounte'r him in open combat, or on. equal terms,
if even that, where the occasion was sought by him, would have
been a defence-but sought his opportunity, and when it was evident
the deceased, if he had sought a renconter, had given it over, at
least for the time, he pursued, and unobserved by the deceased, took
his position by the way side, where, still unobserved, he waited his
approach, and as the deceased was passing with no manifestation of.
hostile intentions, shot him from under cover and without giving
him timely notice to stand in defence of his life or to make good his
retreat, and only sufficient to embitter the last moment of his life
by the consciousness that he died by the hand of his enemy. We
abstain from comment. It is unnecessary. It is very evident that
to denominate this a killing upon self-defence, would be an abuse of
terms. There .manifestly was no immediate danger or present
necessity to bring it within the principle which excuses a homicide
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committed for self-preservation-no provocation, which the law will
recognize to extenuate or reduce the degree of the crime-there
was indeed nothing attending, or giving character to the act which
the law regards as matter in justification, excuse, or extenuation.
There can be but one opinion as to the true character and degree
of the crime.
Nor could the Court have intended to rest the doctrine maintained, as to the effect of the previous threats, on the ground that
they supported this defence- For then they would have had the
effect, not merely to extenuate from the first to the second degree
of murder; but they would have constituted a complete justification or excuse of the homicide; and of course it could not have
been murder of any degree, or manslaughter; but justifiable homicide.
The error of the Court evidently arose from confounding previous threats with a "threatened attack," or menacing present
danger, or as the terms import, the manifestation by act of a present
intention of immediate attack; but particularly and most materially,
from confounding malice in a legal sense, with malice in its popular
signification ; in which it is used to denote an evil or -malevolent
motive and disposition of the mind; and from not bearing in mind
that every intentional killing of any reasonable being, by a voluntary free agent of sound memory and discretion, unless justified
by command of the law; excused by its permission, as in the case
of self-defence; or extenuated by some sufficient legal provocation
or by being the involuntary consequence of some act not strictly
lawful is in a legal sense malicious ; and no inquiry can be instituted into the actual motive and disposition of the mind which
prompted the act, except by proof of the facts which make out the
justification, legal, excuse,'or extenuation. For all homicide is presumed -to be malicious, and of course amounting to murder, until
the contrary appears, from circumstances of alleviation, excuse or
justification ; and those circumstances which go to alleviate, excuse
or justify, it is incumbent on the -accused to make out in evidence,
unless they arise out of the evidence. produced against him. When
the law makes use of the term malice aforethought as descriptive of
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the crime of murder, it is not to be understood merely in the.sense
of principle of malevolence to particulars, but as meaning that the
fact has been attended with such circumstances as are the ordinary
symptoms of a wicked and malignant spirit. (1 Russ. on Cr. 482)
Malice "in its legal sense, denotes a wrongful act done intentionally
without just cause or excuse." (I Id. 483 n. i. 5th Am. from 3d
London edit.) "The legal import of the ter'm (it has been said)
differs from its acceptation in common conversation. It is not, as
in ordinary speech, only an expression of hatred and ill-will to an
individual, but means any wicked or mischievous intention of the
mind. Thus, in the crime of murder, which is always stated in the
indictment to be committed with malice aforethought, it is neither
necessary in support of such indictment to show that the prisoner
had any enmity to the deceased, nor would proof of absence of illwill furnish, the accused with any defence when it is proved that the
act of killing was intentional, and done without any justifiable
cause." (Per Best, J, 2 B. and C. 268, 1 Russ. 483 n. i.) "Malice
in law is a mere inference of law, which results simply from a
wilful transgression of the law." (2 Stark. Ev. 674.) It imlports
simply the perverse disposition of one who does an act which is unlawful, without a sufficient legal excuse therefor; "a n d the precise•
and particular intention with which he did the act; whether he was
moved ' ira vel odio vel causa lucri,' is immaterial-he acts maliciously in wilfuly transgressing the law.," (Id.)
If the idea which the charge of 'the Court evidently conveys,
that the real motive and disposition of mind .which prompted the
commission of the deed gives character to the crime and determines
its degree, were the law, then there could be no homicide which'
might not be reduced to murder in the second degree, or ever to
excusable or justifiable homicide; no matter in what particular
manner the homicide may have been committed. For if the motive
is to govern in determining the degree of crime, then, of course, in
that view, it can make no difference in what manner the killing was
effected; whether by laying in wait, "by poison, starving, or torture," instances given in the statute of murder in the first degree,
or by "other premeditated and deliberate killing," or whether
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"committed in the perpetration or attempt" to perpetrate any of
the crimes mentioned in the Statute (Dig. Art. 501), still the inquiry might be by what real motive and disposition of mind the
party killing was actuated, and if the jury should be of opinion
that it really was not "from a wicked and malicious intent, but from
a just and well grounded apprehension, for the preservation of his
own life" from future danger, it would only be murder in the second
degree; and with equal reason it might be held to be neither murder nor manslaughter, but justifiable homicide. For if the motive
is to control, then, of course, it follows that we must search for and
be governed by the true motive; and if we are at liberty to suppose
that a wilful, premeditated and deliberate killing may be from any
motive which the law does not deem "wilful and malicious," as the
charge supposes, then we may with equal reason be at liberty to suppose that the real motive which prompted the act was not in the
least reprehensible; and hence conclude that the agent does not
merit the punishment even of murder in the second degree, or indeed any punishment whatever. It may be supposed that those
native tribes who, we are told, put an end to the lives of their aged
and infirm, in order to relieve them from their suffering, are not
really prompted by a wicked and maliciois intent, in the common
acceptation of the terms. Yet no one will suppose that our law
would tolerate suchi a plea. Of course it is not to be supposed that
the Court ever thought of carrying the doctrine to any such extravagant length as this. The contrary is shown by the limiting of the
extenuation,.deduced from the real motive and disposition of mind
of the accused, to murder in the second degree. But the illustrations are employed for the purpose of showing to what consequences
it might lead if the inquiry were once admitted into the real-motive
which prompted the act as a ground of extenuation or excuse for
the crime. It would confQund all legal ideas and rules in relation
to the degrees of homicide. As observed by Mr. Starkie, "Whenever the law .defines a right, or prescribes the performance of a
duty, or prohibits a particular act, the wilful violation of the right,
omission of the duty, or transgression without legal excuse is necessarily illegal without regard to intention; it wquld be manifestly
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mischievous, and even inconsistent with the very notion of law as a
general rule of conduct, to allow the crude opinions of individuals
to supercede the force of law." (2 Stark. Ev. 670, tit. "Malice.")
"All murder committed by poison, starving, torture, or other premeditated and deliberate killing," "is murder in the first degree."
(Dig. art. 501.) Murder thus committed can be of no less degree.
In such killing the law necessarily implies malice, from the fact of
killing without lawful excuse, whatever may have bten the real motive prompting to the commission of the deed.
Every intentional killing is not necessarily murder. For it may
be from a principle of inevitable necessity; and then it will be selfdefence; it may be done in the transport of passion and heat of
blood upon a sudden and sufficient legal provocation; and then it
will be manslaughter only; or it may be done by the coifimand or
permission of the law, and then it will be justifiable or excusable
homicide. But if it be unattended by any of those circumstances
of alleviation, excuse or justification which will relieve the party
killing from the guilt of murder: if it be murder within the proper
legal meaning of that term, and be a "premeditated and deliberate
killing," within the meaning of those terms as employed in the
Statute, it will necessarily be murder in the first degree.
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the Court did err in the
part of the charge we have considered. But there is as little doubt
that it was an error in favor of the appellant; one which operated
in his favor, and which, under the evidence in the case, could not
possibly have operated to his prejudice, and upon no principle can
it be maintained that for such an error the Court would be warranted in reversing the judgment.
The cases cited by-counsel for the appellant (decided in Ga. And
Tenn.,) have not been adverted to, for the reason that they were
not deemed applicable to the questions arising in this case. In
Eowell vs. The State (5 Geo. R. 48) which was an indictment for
an assault with intent to murder, the question was as to the admissibility in evidence of the threats of the party assaulted, and they
were held admissible. In the present case they were admitted
without objection; and of course there was and could be no*question
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as to their admissibility, arising, to be determined upon this appeal.
In MuMnroe vs. The State, (Id. 85,) which was an indictment for
murder, the same point was decided; and it was held that "threats
accompanied with occasional acts of personal violence, are admissible to justify the reasonableness of the defendant's fears, provided a
knowledge of these thfeats is brought home to him." But there is no
doctrine or opinion advanced in the case which ascribes to mere
threats unaccompanied with acts any such effect as is claimed for
them in the present case. The other is the case of Granger vs.
The State, 5 Yerger, 459, which has been the subject of much
comment, and doubtless some misapprehension as to what it was
intended to decide. Whart. Am. C. L. 260. The language of the
Court seems not to have been sufficiently guarded. But it does not
treat of the question presented in the present case. And to do
justice to the judgment of the Court in that case, it is necessary to
look not alone to the language of the opinion, but to the facts of
the case present to the mind of the Court: and to bear in mind
that the question was not whether the accused was justifiable or
excusable (for it is evident the Court did not intend to intimate that
he was uot guilty of manslaughter) but simply whether the homicide was, under the circumstances, " of malice prepense so as to
exclude the benefit of clergy." There is no analogy or resemblance
in the facts of either this or the other cases cited, to the present
case. Their examination here, therefore, would be out of place.
The present is deemed a fit occasion to remark that it is matter
of surprise that the Legislature should- have thought proper to limit
the security which may be had in a recognizance to bind over to
keep the peace before a justice, to the sum of two thousand dollars;
that it should have been thought necessary to fix such a limit to the
security which a man may demand, (without resorting to a higher
tribunal, often impracticably,) against a threatened injury to his
person or property. Dig. Art. 1701. It could scarcely have been
intended to deny a man whose personal safety is endangered by
the wanton violence of 'another, the right to demand that the other
should be restrained of his liberty and the ability to endanger his
life and the peace of society, until he will give gecurity in. such a
sum as will be amply sufficient to afford that protection which it is
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the duty of government and the intention of the law to afford.
The law should extend to every man's rights its ample shield snd
protection. No man, and especially no man who desires to respect
the law and the rights of others, should be denied the utmost protection which the law can afford against any threatened invasion of
his own rights; or should, by reason of the want of such protection, be driven to the necessity " to do himself that immediate
justice to which he is prompted by nature, and which no prudential
motiVes are strong enough to restrain." When violence is threatened-and a man may be compelled to repel force by force, because
"it is impossible to say to what wanton lengths of rapine and
cruelty outrages of this sort might be carried unless it were permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another,"
and the future piocess of the law can for such injury afford no adequate redress-the strong arm of the law should be interposed for
prevention; and there should be no limit to the security which may
be demandedshort of that which will be amply and certainly sufficient to insure its object. And if such security were promptly
afforded in every proper case, it might indeed be said that, "1instead
of attacking one another for injuries past or impending, men need
only have recourse to the proper tribunals of justice." 4 BI. 184.
And the principal pretext which men now have for avenging their
own or imaginary wrongs, would be taken away.
It is supposed that the object of fixing a limit to the amount of
security in recognizance, which a Justice of the Peace may require,
was to guard against an arbitrary abuse of power in those inferior
magistrates. But when it is considered how very little danger is
really to be apprehended from that source, compared with the'
danger that they will not.act sufficiently energetically, and that in
case of abuse, the writ of habeas corpus will afford ready relief, it
will be apparent that the danger of an excessive exercise of power
is rather imaginary than real. And it is to be hoped that this
feature, which now mars the code, will be effaced from its pages.
There is in the record no erroneous ruling adversely to the
appellant. The evidence warranted a conviction upon the charge
preferred in the indictment; and the judgment must therefore be
affirmed.

